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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,

SUPREME COURT NO. 89 0419

Deceased.

Priority 16

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment pursuant to
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Utah

Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (1990 Supp.) and Article VIII of the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

denying Beneficiaries a new trial?1
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it

excluded Exhibits A, B, C and D pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, but admitted into evidence a written
stipulation conceding the relevant portions of Exhibits A, B, C
and D?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court will not reverse a trial court's evidentiary
ruling, including those pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of

1

Although the Beneficiaries asserted additional bases for a
new trial, they have only appealed two: (1) the parol evidence
rule, infra at 16-26; and (2) estoppel, infra at 26-29.
101590. mbjr.aplbrief.ray

Evidence, unless the trial court has abused its discretion.
State v, Larsen. 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989).

fl

[T]he error

must have been harmful" to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Larsen, 775 P.2d at 419.

See also Utah R. Evid. 103.

A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial will
not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Lembach v. Cox,

639 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1981), overruled on other grounds, 728 P.2d 117
(1986).

The trial court's abuse must be "clearly shown."

Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Co.. 27 Utah 2d 430, 497
P.2d 236, 238 (1972).

It must appear that "'[its] action was

arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any reasonable bounds
of discretion.'"

Lembach, 639 P.2d at 201 (quoting from Hyland

v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967)).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1):
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context.
Utah R. Evid. 401:
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.

1 0l590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray

2

Utah R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,
This was an action by some beneficiaries

("Beneficiaries") of Clarence I. Justheim ("Clarence") to recover
certain stock given by Clarence to Raymond A. Ebert ("Ray").
B.

The Course of Proceedings.
On June 29, 1984, St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish

(the "Parish") filed a petition to remove Ray as personal
representative of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim (the
"Estate") and as trustee of a trust created by Clarence (the
"Removal Issue") and to recover stock in Wyoming Petroleum
Company given to Ray by Clarence before his death (the "Gift
Issue").

(R. 61-66).

Other beneficiaries subsequently joined in

the Parish's petition.

Trial was scheduled for May 27, 1986. At

trial, the parties agreed to try just the Removal Issue and
reserve the Gift Issue for later resolution.

(R. 1004).

The Removal Issue was tried on various days in May,
June and July, 1986.

On August 5, 1986, the trial court entered

a Decree denying the petitions to remove Ray.

(R. 1154-58).

On

August 25, 1986, the trial court entered an Order of
Certification that the Decree was a final order under Rule 54(b)

/ 01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Beneficiaries appealed the Decree.

(R. 1159-61).

(R. 1171-72).

The

On July 18,

1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Decree.

(R. 2775-

78) .
C.

Disposition in the Court Below.
The Gift Issue was tried by the Third Judicial District

Court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding, in June, 1989.
The jury returned a verdict in Ray's favor.

(R. 2655).

Judge

Murphy, acting independently as a factfinder, also found in Ray's;
favor.

(Tr. 2905.186-88).

On July 7, 1989, Judge Murphy entered

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree and Judgment on
Verdict upholding the intervivos gifts to Ray.

(R. 2677-81).

The Beneficiaries filed a Motion for New Trial which Judge Murphy
denied.

(R. 2718-24, 55). This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Originally, Clarence owned 127,743 shares in Wyoming

Petroleum Company ("Wyoco") which represented 50% control.

(Tr.

2907.80-82, 87-94; Tr. Exs. 3, 15). Subsequently, Clarence
bought another 23,400 shares of Wyoco stock which represented
majority control.

(Tr. 2907.89-93; Tr. Ex. 15). Clarence gave

all his Wyoco stock to Ray.
A.

(Tr. 2907.80-82, 93-95),

The Gifts
In May 1981, Ray visited Clarence at home.

(Tr.

2907.80, 85; Tr. Ex. 2). Clarence handed some stock to Ray and
said "Here, Ray.

101590.mb.jr.aplbnef.ray

I want you to have these."

4

(Tr. 2907.81).

The

stock represented 120,431 shares in Wyoco.2

(Tr. 2907.129; Tr.

Ex. 1). Ray took the stock home where he kept it until after
Clarence's death.

(Tr. 2907.84-85).

In Spring 1982, Clarence bought another 23,400 shares
of Wyoco stock.

(Tr. 2907.89-93).

In May 1982, while Ray was

visiting, Clarence handed some more stock to Ray and said "Here,
this is all my stock in Wyoming Petroleum, and I want you to have
it."

(Tr. 2907.93-94).

The stock represented 30,712 shares.3

(Tr. Ex. 3). Ray took the stock home and kept it with the other
stock until after Clarence's death.
B.

(Tr. 2907.94-95).

Clarence's Regard For Ray
Ray and Clarence met in 1945 as co-employees of the

United States Postal Service.

(Tr. 2907.57-58).

In

approximately 1948, Clarence resigned from the postal service to
conduct his own business interests.

(Tr. 2907.58).

From about

1947 until his death, Ray participated in several of Clarence's
business ventures.

(Tr. 2907.59-62).

Beginning in 1953, Ray

purchased shares on the public market in Justheim Petroleum
Company ("Justco"), another of Clarence's business interests.
(Tr. 2907.61).
in Justco.

Ray ultimately owned or controlled 180,000 shares

(Tr. 2907.61-62).

2

Clarence kept one certificate which represented 7,312
shares. (Tr. Ex. 3).
3

The second gift included the newly acquired 23,400 shares
plus the 7,312 shares originally possessed by Clarence but kept
by him when he made the first gift of 12 0,431 shares.
10l590.mb.jr.apU>nef.my
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Prior to retiring, Clarence had asked Ray to work for
him on three or four occasions, but Ray had declined.
(Tr. 2907.61).

In 1971, Ray retired from the postal service.

(Tr. 2907.59).

In 1973, Clarence asked and Ray agreed to serve

as a director of Justco.

(Tr. 2907.62).

In 1978, Clarence asked Frank Allen ("Allen"), his
attorney, to prepare an estate plan.

(Tr. 2908.76, 78-79).

Ray

still owned stock in Justco, and was still a director.
(Tr. 2907.61-62).

Clarence asked Ray to be his personal

representative and trustee.

(Tr. 2907.62).

On June 22, 1978,

Clarence executed his Will designating Ray personal
representative4 and an inter vivos trust appointing Ray trustee.5
(Tr. Exs. 8, 9 ) .
Clarence amended his inter vivos trust on five
occasions:

March 22, 1979, June 7, 1979, January 17, 1980,

January 21, 1980, and January 1981.

(Tr. Exs. 10-14).

None of

the amendments changed Clarence's original appointment of Ray.
The January 1981 amendment added Ray as a .005 percent residuary
beneficiary.

(Tr. Ex. 14). Clarence orally reaffirmed his

confidence in Ray when he discussed the amendments with Allen.
(Tr. 2904.11).

4

The Will also designated Allen to act as the Estate's
attorney. (Tr. Ex. 8).
5

Clarence's wife, Margaret, also executed a will and inter
vivos trust designating and appointing Ray her personal
representative and trustee. (R. 1649-50).
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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In November 1978, Clarence was seriously injured in an
automobile accident. (Tr. 2907.64).

For two or three weeks after

the accident, Clarence was incoherent.

(Tr. 2907.64-65).

During

that time, Ray frequently visited or checked on Clarence.
(Tr. 2907.64).

After Clarence became coherent,

am going to need some help."

(Tr. 2907.68).

he told Ray l!I

Ray said he would

help.
Clarence remained in the hospital until February 1979.
During that time, Ray visited Clarence three to five times a
week.

Among other things, Ray picked up Clarence's mail,

delivered the mail and other items to Clarence at the hospital
and returned materials and Clarence's instructions to the office.
(Tr. 2907.69).
After Clarence was released and until his death, he was
substantially confined to his home.

(Tr. 2907.70-74, 2906.148).

For some five years, Ray spent six days a week, twenty minutes to
five hours a day helping Clarence and Chickie.

(Tr. 2907.70).

Ray visited Clarence, typed his personal correspondence,
delivered his personal and corporate mail for him, assisted him
in his personal affairs, shopped for him, help him care for his
invalid wife, and generally provided him the kind of comfort and
companionship a confined person craves.
did whatever Clarence wanted.

(Tr. 2907.70-74).

Ray

Ray acted purely out of friendship

and affection and was not motivated by expectation of
compensation.

/ 01590.mb.jr.aplbnef.ray

(Tr. 2907.75).

In fact, Ray never asked to be

1

compensated.6

Clarence's relationship with Mrs. Ebert was also a

source of comfort for him in his last years; Clarence called her
almost nightly, and they ended their conversations with common
prayer.
C.

(Tr. 2906.130-32).

Corroboration For The Gifts.
In 1979, Clarence asked Allen to amend his trust.

(Tr. 2908.83-85).

Clarence wanted to include the Parish and its

Dean as beneficiaries.

(Tr. 2908.85).

Although Allem had not

yet met Ray, Clarence had often expressed to Allen affection for
Ray.

(Tr. 2904.26-27, 29-31).

Allen asked Clarence, "If you're

going to take care of people other than your family, what about
Ray Ebert?"

(Tr. 2904.30, 2908.84).

taking care of Ray."

Clarence replied "I'm

(Tr. 2904.31).

In early 1981, Clarence told Allen he wanted to give
Ray (whom Allen still had not met) Wyoco stock.
93).

(Tr. 2908.90-

Clarence asked if he could make the gift without

transferring the stock on Wyoco's books.

(Tr. 2908.90-91).

Allen said formal transfer was not necessary, and that a gift
could be made by delivering endorsed certificates with a
declaration of present donative intent.

(Tr. 2908.91).

Ray told his wife, Grace, about the first and second
gifts immediately after each had been made.
first gift, Ray went home.

(Tr. 2907.84).

home, he "waved" the stock at Grace.

6

After receiving the
As Ray entered his

(Id.; Tr. 2907.136).

Clarence periodically reimbursed Ray for small out of
pocket expenses. (Tr. 2907.75).
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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Ray

said to Grace "Mr. Clarence Justheim has given me over $100,000 - I mean 100,000 shares of Wyoming Petroleum."

(Tr. 2906.136).

After receiving the second gift, Ray took the stock home.
(Tr. 2907.94-95; 2906.137-39).
brown envelope.

The stock was contained in a

(Tr. 2907.94-95).

When Ray arrived home, Grace

noticed a "big brown envelope" in his hands.

(Tr. 2906.139).

Ray told Grace "Clarence had gotten the stock that he [Ebert] had
gotten, and that was all the stock in Wyoming Petroleum that he
owned, and gave it to Ray as a gift."
On May 28, 1981, Clarence asked Ray to type up a
document from several handwritten notes.

(Tr. 2907.85-86).

Ray

typed the document and took it to Clarence the following day.
(Tr. 2907.86).
Ray's presence.

On May 29, 1981, Clarence signed the document in
That document is the Codicil to Clarence's Will.

(Tr. Ex. 2). The Codicil states in pertinent part:
I hereby give, bequeath, and devise to Raymond A.
Ebert, to be his absolutely, without accountability in
the distribution provided for in the residuary of my
said will, all of my interest and stock holdings in the
Wyoming Petroleum Corp., if he is living . . . .
(Tr. Ex. 2). Although the Codicil was not properly witnessed for
probate purposes,7 it is direct evidence of Clarence's desire
that Ray receive the Wyoco stock.

7

The Beneficiaries claim that the Application For Informal
Probate of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal
Representative filed with the trial court did not disclose the
Codicil's invalid testamentary effect. (Appellants' Brief, at
5). Not so. The Application referred to the Will and the
Codicil. The Application represented that the Will was validly
executed, but made no such representation about the Codicil.
(Tr. Ex. 17, ff 8-9). Furthermore, a copy of the Codicil was
attached which clearly disclosed the lack of requisite witnesses.
Ebert never asserted the Codicil was valid as a testamentary
instrument.
101590.mb.jr.aplbtief.ray

9

D.

Clarence's Relationship With John Morgan Jr.
During his life, Clarence associated professionally

with John H. Morgan, Sr. ("Morgan Sr.").
44).

(Tr. 2907.83, 2906.143-

For more than thirty years, they and their businesses

shared offices, used the same secretarial staff and often did
business together.

(Tr. 2907.83, 2906.144-45).

In 1953, Morgan

Sr. and Clarence agreed to share and maintain equal control of
Wyoco.

(Tr. 2907.89-90, 2906.150).

In 1950, John H. Morgan, Jr.

("Morgan, Jr.") became associated professionally with Morgan Sr.
and Clarence.

(Tr. 2906.145).

By at least 1978, Clarence's relationship with the
Morgans had begun to deteriorate.

In 1978, when Clarence asked

Allen to prepare an estate plan, he expressed resentment toward
Morgan Jr. interfering in his affairs.

(Tr. 2908.94-95).

Clarence told Allen that Morgan Jr. had been urging him to
establish an estate plan because of the effect his death would
have on Morgan Jr.'s business.

On several occasions, Clarence

expressed to Allen his resentment toward, fear of and his
inability to resist Morgan Jr. (Tr. 2908.93-95, 98-99, 2904.310) .
In 1980, Clarence told Allen that Morgan Jr. had
demanded that Clarence make Morgan Jr. a co-trustee under his
Trust.

(Tr. 2908.96, 98-99).

Clarence asked Allen to prepare an

amendment appointing Morgan Jr. co-trustee to avoid additional
harassment, but also asked Allen to prepare an amendment which
would revoke that appointment.

101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ruy

(Tr. 2908.99-105).
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Clarence

asked Ray to type the amendment revoking Morgan Jr.'s appointment
from a handwritten draft prepared by Allen (Tr. Ex. 27).
(Tr. 2906.68-73).

Clarence refused to sign the amendment

appointing Morgan Jr. (Tr. Ex. 12) until another had been
prepared revoking the appointment (Tr. Ex. 13).
(Tr. 2907.145-46, 2908.104-05).

Clarence executed the amendment

appointing Morgan Jr. on January 17, 1980.

(Tr. Ex. 12). On

January 21, 1980, Clarence executed the amendment revoking Morgan
Jr.'s appointment.

(Tr. Ex. 13).

In 1981, when Clarence asked Allen about giving Wyoco
stock to Ray, Clarence said he did not want to transfer the gift
on Wyoco's books.

(Tr. 2908.90-91).

Clarence was concerned that

Morgan Jr. would discover the gift, if transferred, because
Morgan Jr. had access to Wyoco's books.

(Tr. 2907.82-83).

Clarence wanted to avoid further harassment from Morgan Jr. (Tr.
2904.7).

At the time of the first gift, Clarence asked Ray to

not disclose the gift to the Morgans.

(Tr. 2907.119).

Ray

understood he was not to transfer the stock until after
Clarence's death.

(Tr. 2907.82-83, 119).

In February 1982, Morgan Sr. died. (Tr. 2907.83).
Subsequently, Clarence set out to buy additional Wyoco stock to
gain control of Wyoco and to keep control away from Morgan Jr.
(Tr. 2907.89-93, 95, 2904.5-10).

Shortly after Morgan Sr.'s

death, Clarence bought 2 3,4 00 additional shares of Wyoco stock.
(Tr. 2907.90-93).

At the time of the second gift, Clarence told

Ray again "Be damn sure you don't let Bud [Morgan Jr.] know
7 01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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nothing about them."

(Tr. 2906.5).

Clarence further remarked

that he "wanted to show these Morgans he wasn't —
dumb as they thought he was."

(Tr. 2907.95).

he wasn't as

Clarence repeated

his request that Ray not transfer the stock until after his
death.
E.

(Tr. 2907.119, 2906.63-66).

Clarence's Family
Clarence died on July 3, 1983.

(Tr. 2906.130, 2901,12,

Clarence's wife was an invalid.
Clarence had no children.
relatives.
F.

(Tr. 2907.77).

(Tr. 2906.130).

78-80).

Clarence had no close

(Tr. 2907.75-77, 2904.34-35).

Ray's Disclosure to Allen
Approximately a week after Clarence's death, Ray

delivered Clarence's Will, Codicil, Trust and its amendments to
Allen.

(Tr. 2907.101).

Prior to July 22, 1983, Ray met with

Allen and discussed the Codicil and both gifts.
04, 106-08, 2904.13-19).

(Tr. 2907.102-

Allen advised Ray the Codicil had no

testamentary effect because it lacked the requisite witnesses.
(Tr. 2904.18).

Allen explained, however, that the Codicil was

written evidence of Clarence's intent to give Ray the stock.
(Tr. 2907.114).

After thoroughly questioning Ray about the

gifts, Allen was convinced Ray was telling the truth.
(Tr. 2904.21).

Based on that, Allen advised Ray that the stock

would not be included as property of the Estate initially and the
issue would be submitted to the probate court for final
determination.

101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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G.

John Morgan Jr.'s Animosity Toward Rav
Immediately after Clarence's funeral, Ray informed

Morgan Jr. that Clarence had revoked Morgan Jr.'s appointment as
co-trustee.

(Tr. 2907.227).

demanded proof.
to Allen.
Ray.

Morgan Jr. became visibly angry and

(id.; Tr. 2906.99-100).

Ray referred Morgan Jr.

That incident sparked Morgan Jr.'s hostility toward

(Tr. Ex. 19).
Morgan Jr. believed he was entitled to succeed to his

father's agreement with Clarence to share and maintain equal
control of Wyoco.

(Tr. 2906.173-74).

After Clarence acquired

majority control of Wyoco, Morgan Jr. pestered Clarence to sell
him 50% of the control stock.
(Tr. 2906.174).

(Tr. 2906.113).

Clarence refused.

Shortly after Clarence's death, Ray told Morgan

Jr. he owned the Wyoco stock.

(Tr. 2906.98-101).

Thereafter,

Morgan Jr. requested that Ray sell him 50% of the control stock.
(Tr. 2906.174).

Ray also refused.

(Tr. 2906.175).

Prior to his death, Justheim, Justco and Wyoco had made
substantial investments in certain projects sponsored by Morgan
Jr. (Tr. 2906.168-69).

After Clarence's death, Morgan Jr.

besieged Ray to get Justco, Wyoco and the Estate to continue
their investments.

(Tr. 2906.171-73).

Estate stopped making investments.

Justco, Wyoco and the

(Tr. 2906.173).

Morgan Jr. blamed Ray for the revocation of his
appointment as co-trustee, Clarence's acquisition of the control
stock, his subsequent refusal to sell Morgan Jr. 50% of that
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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stock and the discontinuance of investments in Morgan Jr.'s
projects.

(Tr. 2906.173, 176-84).

Ray's control of Wyoco.

Morgan Jr. was bothered by

(Tr. 2906.180-84, 191). Morgan Jr. was

so bothered, he ultimately sued Ray in four separate actions
relating to Ray's control of Wyoco.

(Tr. 2906.176-84).

In fact,

this action was originated with and financed by Morgan Jr. in an
attempt to oust Ray and gain control of Wyoco.

(Tr. 2906.180-

84) .
In the heat of those emotions, Morgan Jr. wrote Ray on
October 10, 1983, November 21, 1983, December 4, 1983 and January
21, 1984.8

(Tr. Exs. A, B, C and D).

Among other irrelevant

things, Morgan Jr. initially inquired about and later challenged
Ray's claim to the Wyoco stock through the Codicil.

Ray never

responded to Morgan Jr. (Tr. 2906.152, 154).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Beneficiaries have waived their parol evidence rule
and estoppel objections.

The Beneficiaries first complained

after a verdict and judgment had been rendered.

The

Beneficiaries have never specified the evidence which should have
been excluded.

They are too late.

Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett, 73 5

P.2d 1308 (Utah 1987); Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v.
Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983); Peterson v. HansenNiederhauser, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 355, 374 P.2d 513 (1962).

Exhibit D is incorrectly dated January 21, 1983. All
parties stipulated that the correct date was January 21, 1984.
(Tr. 2898.31-32).
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray

14

The parol evidence rule violation relates to the
Codicil which Ray offered as collateral evidence to the ultimate
issue of whether or not the gifts were valid.

The parol evidence

contradicted a factual recital in the Codicil, not its terms. No
evidence of integration was offered.
evidence rule was inapplicable.

Therefore, the parol

Weaver v. Modula, 557 P.2d 152

(Utah 1976); Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985);
Fullmer v. Morrill, 2 Utah 2d 347, 273 P.2d 885 (1954).
The Beneficiaries did not offer any evidence at trial
and do not assert on appeal that:

(1) Ray made a false

representation to or concealed any material facts from them; (2)
they were without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the true
facts; (3) Ray intended to induce them to detrimentally change
their position; and (4) they relied on Ray's conduct or silence
to their detriment.
inapplicable.

Absent that evidence, estoppel is

Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) .
The Beneficiaries have failed to demonstrate that the
trial court abused its discretion in excluding Exhibits A, B, C
and D pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
exhibits were irrelevant.

The

The exhibits did not support the

theory for which they were offered.

The testimony of Morgan Jr.,

the exhibits1 author, contradicted the exhibits1 content.

The

trial court considered the entire exhibits and their substance
was considered by the jury.

The exhibits were cumulative and

accused Ray of speculative and collateral misconduct.
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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The danger

of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the exhibits1
probative value.

Utah R. Evid. 403.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE ALLEGED
IMPROPER ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE.
The Beneficiaries assert the trial court improperly
admitted certain parol evidence, entitling them to a new trial.
To reverse, this Court must determine that the trial court
transgressed all reasonable bounds of discretion in finding that
the parol evidence rule was inapplicable and therefore, denied
Beneficiaries a new trial.

Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 201

(Utah 1981), overruled on other grounds, 728 P. 2d 117 (1986); Lee v.
Howes, 548 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1976).
A.

The Beneficiaries Have Waived Any Alleged Error.
The Beneficiaries did not raise the issue of parol

evidence in the pretrial order.

(R. 2490-2525).

The

Beneficiaries made no pretrial motion to exclude any parol
evidence.

The Beneficiaries concede their failure to object to

the admission of any parol evidence during trial.

(Appellants1

Brief, at 15). The Beneficiaries did not move to strike the
parol evidence during trial.

The Beneficiaries first raised the

issue after the trial court had rendered its decision and the
jury had rendered its verdict.9

The Beneficiaries have never

9

The Beneficiaries imply that they have preserved their
objection by raising it in their post-trial motions.
(Appellants' Brief, at 15). The Beneficiaries have not cited any
law. In Utah, a motion to strike improper evidence made after a
verdict has been rendered is untimely. See Peterson v. Hansen10l590.mb.)r.aplbn£f.ray
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specified the evidence which they claim should have been
excluded.
The Beneficiaries argue their failure to object during
trial should not preclude this Court from addressing the parol
(Appellants1 Brief, at 15-17).

evidence issue.

The

Beneficiaries suggest there is a "modern trend" to address the
parol evidence rule on appeal despite a party's failure to object
at trial.

(Id. at 16-17).

The Beneficiaries rely on an

annotation at 81 A.L.R. 3d 249.

(£d. at 16).

does not show a trend, past or modern.
published thirteen years ago.

That annotation

The annotation was

The original annotation cites

twenty-three states and one federal jurisdiction allegedly
supporting the Beneficiaries' position.

The cases from those

jurisdictions range in dates from 1944 to 1975.
257-59, 264-66.

81 A.L.R. 3d, at

The original annotation also cites twenty-two

states which preclude the parol evidence issue on appeal.
254, 256, 260-62.

Id. at

At most, the original annotation shows a split

across the country.
The updated annotation shows a greater trend to
preclude the parol evidence rule on appeal absent an objection

Niederhauser. Inc.. 13 Utah 2d 355, 374 P.2d 513, 515 (1962).
"Expansion on non-specific objections in a motion for a new trial
or in a brief on appeal . . . does not cure the lack of
timeliness in making proper objections to the trial court."
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859,
861 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added). If a motion for a new trial
cannot cure an untimely non-specific objection, an entirely new
objection raised on a motion for new trial can not preserve the
issue for appeal.
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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during trial.

81 A.L.R. 3d 249 (Supp. 1990).

The 1990

Supplement lists twelve jurisdictions precluding the issue on
appeal and eight jurisdictions allowing the issue.

Two of the

jurisdictions precluding the issue (Oklahoma and Michigan) were
listed by the original annotation as jurisdictions which did not
preclude the issue on appeal.
More significant is that neither the annotation nor the
Beneficiaries have referred to Utah's position.

Rule 103 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence states:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was
not apparent from the context . . . .
(emphasis added).

The objection must be made prior to or during

trial and the grounds for the objection must be "clear and
specific."

State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986).

See also State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982);
Stagmever v. Latham Bros.. Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279,
282 (1968).
Rule 103 applies to the admission of parol evidence.
In Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett, 735 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1987), this
Court held that the appellants had waived any claim that
extrinsic evidence should have been excluded by their failure to
object at the trial level.

I01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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The only issue at trial

was the construction of a written instrument.
parol evidence.

Neither party objected.

rendered its decision.
appeal.

Both sides offered

The trial court

Appellants first raised the issue on

This Court wrote:

"Because defendants did not object to

the extrinsic evidence at the trial level, they cannot claim on
appeal that the document is clear and unambiguous and is not
subject to interpretationn [sic] with extrinsic evidence."
The Beneficiaries argue judicial economy will be served
by adopting a rule that parol evidence need not be objected to at
trial.10

(Appellants1 Brief, at 17).

To the contrary, such a

rule would destroy judicial economy and cause considerable waste
to the courts and litigants.
adopted, Rule 103 ignored

If the Beneficiaries1 position were

and Co-Vest overruled, an element of

"risk and advantage" would exist.

See Petersen v. Hansen -

Niederhauser. Inc.. 13 Utah 2d 355, 374 P.2d 513, 515 (1962).

A

party could remain silent as inadmissible evidence is admitted.
If the evidence is favorable, the party could permit it to stand
and argue it to the factfinder.

Id.

After losing, the party

could appeal and be guaranteed a reversal and new trial.

Id.

The opposing party would be subjected to the cost and delay of
the appeal and new trial, all of which could be avoided by a
timely objection.

10

The Beneficiaries cite Furniture Manufacturers Sales,
Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984) as an illustration of
how judicial economy will be served. (Appellants1 Brief, at 17).
To the contrary, Deamer does not address judicial economy at all.
Deamer does illustrate, however, that if a party does not object
at trial, any error is waived. Id. at 400.
101590 mb jr aplbnef ray
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This case is a perfect example.

The Beneficiaries

remained silent as the alleged inadmissible evidence was
received.

(Appellants1 Brief, at 15).

On cross-examination, the

Beneficiaries elicited from Ray testimony of the alleged
inconsistency between the first gift and the factual recital of
Clarence's stock ownership in the Codicil.
165-67).

(Tr. 2907.149-50,

In opening and closing, the Beneficiaries argued the

Codicil conclusively established that the first gift was
inconsistent and false.

(Tr. 2907.33-34, 2905.146).

Having

taken the risk and lost, the Beneficiaries now want the advantage
of a new trial.

The Beneficiaries1 position creates judicial

instability and judges would become advocates.

To preserve the

reliability of verdicts and judgments, judges would have to take
the initiative to object, or remind counsel to object and exclude
the evidence.

That burden is too onerous.

The need for timely

objections is as vital for violations of the parol evidence rule
as any other evidence.

The Beneficiaries should not be allowed

to do nothing to exclude the alleged inadmissible evidence,
elicit testimony and offer evidence of the alleged inconsistency,
argue the alleged inconsistency to the jury and trial judge and
after losing the case argue that the evidence should have been
excluded.
B.

The Parol Evidence Rule is Inapplicable.
The Beneficiaries1 attempt to apply the parol evidence

rule is misplaced.

The parol evidence rule is a "principle of

contract interpretation . . . [with] a very narrow application."
101590.mb.jr.aplbnef.ray
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Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).

The parol

evidence rule applies when the basis of the action is the
construction and enforcement of a written document.
Galey, 458 P.2d 650, 652 (Wyo. 1969).

Edmonds v.

In that case, parol

evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the clear and
unambiguous terms of the written document.

Union Bank v.

Swenson. 707 P.2d at 665.
The Beneficiaries assert the trial court improperly
admitted parol evidence which varied or contradicted the
Codicil.

The action, however, was not brought to construe and

enforce the terms of the Codicil.

It is undisputed that the

Codicil lacked the requisite witnesses to create an effective
testamentary device.

The sole purpose of this action was to

determine the validity of two gifts.11

Ray offered the Codicil

merely as collateral evidence of his relationship with Clarence
and Clarence's intent that Ray ultimately receive the Wyoco
stock.
The parol evidence rule is inapplicable where the
alleged violation of the rule relates to a document which is
offered as collateral evidence to the ultimate issue.
Modula, 557 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah 1976).

Weaver v.

In Weaver, a real estate

agent sued to recover commissions from the prospective sellers.

11

The Beneficiaries argue that both gifts should be
invalidated. (Appellants1 Brief, at 7-8, 21). However, neither
the parol evidence rule nor the estoppel theory affect the second
gift. Clarence's factual recital in the Codicil is only
inconsistent with the first gift.
7 01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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Id, at 152-53.

The agent sought to have his agreement with the

sellers construed and enforced.

The written agency agreement

stated that the sellers would pay the agent a commission if he
found "'a party who is ready, able and willing to buy . . . . 'l!
Id. at 153.

Parol evidence regarding various agreements between

the sellers and a prospective buyer was received.

The trial

court found that the agent had not found an "able" buyer and,
therefore, was not entitled to recover his commissions.
On appeal, the agent asserted the trial court
improperly admitted parol evidence.

This Court held that the

violation of the parol evidence rule related to the terms of the
contracts between the sellers and the buyer, not the agency
contract between the agent and the sellers.

The agency contract

was the basis of the lawsuit and therefore, the parol evidence
rule was inapplicable.

See also Edmonds v. Galey. 458 P.2d 650

(Wyo. 1969) (The Wyoming Supreme Court held that parol evidence
was admissible to construe a deed which was offered cis collateral
evidence to the ultimate issue.

It did not vary the terms of the

agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants.

Id. at 651-52);

Lee v. Kimura, 634 P.2d 1043 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981)(The Hawaii
Court of Appeals held that parol evidence was admissible to
construe a lease which was offered as collateral evidence of the
agreement between the parties, as co-lessees.

Id. at 1045-46);

Doelle v. Ireco Chemicals. 391 F.2d 6, 9 (10th Cir. 1968).
The Wyoming Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
[T]he parol evidence rule, like most things, has its
exceptions. It does not apply where the writing is
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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collateral to the issue involved, and the action is not
based on such writing. To state it another way, the
parol evidence rule applies only where the enforcement
of an obligation created by the writing is
substantially the cause of action. . . .
Edmonds, 458 P.2d at 652. Here, Ray did not seek to enforce the
Codicil.

Ray offered the Codicil as collateral evidence of

Clarence's intent to make the gifts.

The parol evidence rule was

inapplicable.
C.

The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply to Factual Recitals.
The Codicil in its entirety states:
I, Clarence I. Justheim, being of sound and
disposing mind and memory and free from all menace,
fraud, duress, undue influence or restraint whatsoever,
do hereby make this Codicil to my Last Will and
Testament which was signed by me, June 22, 1978.
Prior Disposition I hereby revoke all prior
bequests and testamentary dispositions made by me
concerning my interest and stockholdings in the Wyoming
Petroleum Corp., of which I own approximately Fifty
percent (50%).
I hereby give, bequeath, and devise to Raymond A.
Ray, to be his absolutely, without accountability in
the distribution provided for in the residuary of my
said Will, all of my interest and stockholdings in the
Wyoming Petroleum Corp., if he is living, otherwise to
his children, if any are living, children of deceased
children to take by right of representation.
I have hereunder set my hand, this 29th day of
May, 1981.
GRANTOR:

Clarence I. Justheim
(Tr. Ex. 2). The phrase which the Beneficiaries contend has been
varied by the admission of certain unidentified parol evidence
101590.mb.}r.aplbrief.ray
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is:

"of which I own approximately Fifty percent (50%)."

Clarence's declaration of his ownership percentage is a factual
recital.
The parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence which
contradicts or varies factual recitals.

In Fullmer v. Morrill, 2

Utah 2d 347, 273 P.2d 885 (1954), the plaintiffs agreed to sell
to defendants 76 head of cattle, among other things.
Subsequently, the parties executed an "Agreement" expressing the
defendants1 promise to return the 76 head of cattle "together
with all increase of cattle, consisting in all, 88 (eighty-eight)
. . . ."

Id. at 885-86.
A dispute arose over four cattle.

Jd. at 886. At

trial, plaintiffs unsuccessfully contended that the four cattle
were included in the "88" recited in the "Agreement."

On appeal,

the plaintiffs argued the "Agreement" required defendants to
return 88 head of cattle and defendants could not vary that
obligation by the admission of parol evidence.

Id. at 887. This

Court held that the defendants had promised to return the
original 76 head of cattle and "all the increase."

This Court

further held that the words "'consisting in all, 88 (eightyeight) head1" was not part of the promise, but merely a recital
of fact.

This Court then held that "parol evidence is admissible

to contradict a false recital of fact, the parol evidence rule
applying only to the terms of the Contract."

101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ruy
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See also Garrett v.

Ellison. 72 P.2d 449 (Utah 1937)12 (This Court held that the
parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of parol evidence to
vary "terms" of a contract, but not factual recitals.

Id. at

451-53).
Although the Codicil had no testamentary effect, one of
its clear and unambiguous "terms" was that Ray receive all
Clarence's Wyoco stock.

The Beneficiaries do not claim evidence

varying that term was improperly admitted.13

The Beneficiaries1

only claim is that evidence contradicting Clarence's factual
recital was improperly admitted.

The parol evidence rule does

not prohibit extrinsic evidence which varies factual recitals.
D.

The Beneficiaries Offered No Evidence of Integration.
The parol evidence rule is only applicable where the

parties intended that the written document constitute the sole
and entire agreement between the parties.

Union Bank v. Swenson,

12

The Beneficiaries rely on Garrett for the general
proposition that Utah considers the parol evidence rule a
substantive rule rather than a rule of evidence. (Appellants1
Brief, at 14). The Beneficiaries recognize that this Court did
not apply the parol evidence rule in Garrett. (Id. at 15). The
Beneficiaries, however, fail to explain why. Although Garrett is
cited here for the proposition that the parol evidence rule does
not apply to factual recitals, it is another excellent example
that parol evidence may be admitted to vary an instrument which
is collateral to the primary issue.
13

The gift is not inconsistent with the Codicil's term that
Ray receive all the Wyoco stock. The gift fulfills that term.
The gift is only inconsistent with Clarence's factual recital.
That inconsistency may be more apparent than real. For instance,
Clarence might have made the Codicil as a precaution against the
possibility, in his mind, that the first gift might be invalid
because the stock was not transferred into Ray's name during
Clarence's life.
101590.mb.jr.aplbnef.ray
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707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
integration in the Codicil.

There is no expression of

(Tr. Ex. 2). The Beneficiaries

offered no evidence of integration.

Thus, the parol evidence

rule is not applicable.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DENIED BENEFICIARIES A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
ESTOPPEL WAS INAPPLICABLE
The Beneficiaries assert Ray should have been estopped
from claiming any gifts.

The Beneficiaries assert the trial

court erred in finding that estoppel was inapplicable and
therefore, they are entitled to a new trial.

To reverse, this

Court must determine that the trial court transgressed all
reasonable bounds of discretion in denying Beneficiaries a new
trial.
A.

The Beneficiaries Have Waived Any Alleged Error.
Estoppel must be pleaded or it is waived.

v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980).
not plead estoppel in their petition.

See Manger

The Beneficiaries did

(R. 61-66).

The

Beneficiaries did not assert estoppel in the pretrial order.
2490-2525).

(R.

Prior to trial, the Beneficiaries did not move to

exclude any evidence based on an estoppel theory.

The

Beneficiaries did not object to the admission of or move to
strike any evidence during trial pursuant to their estoppel
theory.

The Beneficiaries did not move for a directed verdict

based on their estoppel theory.

The Beneficiaries first raised

the estoppel theory in their "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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the Verdict and Oral Judgment of the Court"14 after the jury had
rendered its verdict and the trial court had rendered its
decision.
B.

The Beneficiaries are too late.

Estoppel Was Precluded By the Pretrial Order and Pretrial
Motions.
The parties1 Supplemental Pretrial Order excluded

certain issues.

(Id.)

At most, Beneficiaries could argue that

the estoppel theory is included in the issues precluded by the
Supplemental Pretrial Order.
exclude those issues.

In addition, the trial court granted two

pretrial motions in limine.
4-10, 2907.4-6.

The Beneficiaries agreed to the

(R. 2526-33, 65-67, 84-88; Tr. 2898.

Those motions were granted because the issues

had been tried during the trial on the Removal Issue and the
Beneficiaries had been unable to proffer any additional evidence.
(Tr. 2898.4-10, 2907.4-6).

The Beneficiaries have not appealed

those rulings.
C.

Estoppel is Inapplicable.
Estoppel is not favored.

University of Colorado v.

Silverman, 555 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Colo. 1976); Tribble v. Reelv,
557 P.2d 813, 818 (Mont. 1976).

The purpose of equitable

estoppel is "'to prevent one party from deluding or inducing
another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss.111

14

Although the estoppel theory was initially asserted in
this motion, it was incorporated by reference into the Motion for
New Trial. The Beneficiaries have appealed the trial court's
denial of the new trial. (Docketing Statement, dated September
27, 1989, at 5).
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FMA Financial Corp, v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 330
(Utah 1980)(footnote omitted).

The elements of estoppel are:

(1) A false representation or concealment of material
facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the facts; (3) made to a party who is without
knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts;
(4) made with the intention that the representation be
acted upon; and (5) the party to whom the
representation was made relied or acted upon it to his
prejudice.
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

See

also Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298,
13 01-02 (Utah 1982).
no estoppel.
1.

Each element must be proven or there can be

Colman, 743 P.2d at 790.
No Standing —

The Beneficiaries do not have

standing to assert estoppel against Ray.

The Beneficiaries do

not assert that Ray made a false representation to or concealed
material facts from them.
excluded.

Evidence of any such claim was

(R. 2565-67, 84-88; Tr. 2907.4-6).

have not appealed that order.

The Beneficiaries

The Beneficiaries contend Ray

failed to remind Clarence of the first gift when Clarence
executed the Codicil.

Thus, it is Clarence who possessed any

claim of estoppel against Ray, not the Beneficiaries.
2.

Without Knowledge —

The material facts must be

concealed from a person "without knowledge or the means of
knowledge of the real facts."

Colman, 743 P.2d at 790. The

Beneficiaries offered no evidence of their knowledge of the true
facts.

Clarence had knowledge of the true facts.

the donor.
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should have known that the factual recital of his ownership
percentage was incorrect.
3.

Intent to induce is required —

Any concealment of

material fact must be intended to induce the other's detrimental
change in position.

Triple I, 652 P.2d at 1301. The

Beneficiaries offered no evidence that Ray intended to induce
them to change their position.

In fact, the Beneficiaries have

not asserted that Ray communicated with them in any manner
regarding the gift.

Absent some communication, Ray could not

have induced the Beneficiaries into any type of detrimental
conduct.

Jd. at 1302. The Beneficiaries also offered no proof

that Ray intended to induce Clarence to change his position.
4.

Must prove detrimental reliance —

detrimental reliance.

There was no

The Beneficiaries offered no evidence that

Clarence relied on Ray's silence to his prejudice.

Furthermore,

the Beneficiaries offered no evidence that they relied on Rayfs
silence to their prejudice.

The Beneficiaries have implicitly

acknowledged the lack of any detrimental reliance.

(Appellants1

Brief, at 18-19).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING EXHIBITS A, B. C AND D
At the beginning of trial, the Beneficiaries expressed
their intent to call Morgan Jr. as a witness, to use in opening
statement four letters written by Morgan Jr. to Ray, marked as
Exhibits A, B, C and D, and to offer those letters as evidence

/ 01590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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during trial.

(Tr. 2898.10, 16-19).

Ray moved to exclude Morgan

Jr.'s testimony and the letters because they were irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial.

(Tr. 2989.13, 16-17).

After substantial

discussion, the trial court refused to exclude Morgan Jr.'s
testimony on the subject, but excluded the letters pursuant to
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

(Tr. 2989.43, 46, 48,

52-54, 60). Exclusion of the letters was contingent on Ray's
written stipulation admitting certain portions of the letters
which the trial court decided were relevant.15

(Tr. 2898.43-46,

48, 60). Over his objection, Ray entered into the written
stipulation.

(Id.; R. 2594-95)

The written stipulation was to

be admitted as evidence to the jury.

(Tr. 2898.45).

The

Beneficiaries contend the letters should have been admitted in
their entirety.
A.

Probative Value v. Dangers of Unfair Prejudice, Confusion,
Delay and Undue Repetition.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

By the Rule's express language, the trial judge must balance the
probative value of the evidence against the danger of certain

15

The trial court excluded Exhibit C in its entirety
because the relevant portion was cumulative. (Tr. 2898.52-53).
Exhibit C merely repeated what was written in Exhibits A and B
and the Beneficiaries conceded that no change of position had
occurred between the dates of Exhibits B and C. (Id.)
1 01590.mb.jr.ap1bnef.ray
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factors which may improperly influence the jury.
Maurer. 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989).

State v.

After balancing those

interests, if the improper factors outweigh the probative value
of the proffered evidence, it may be excluded.
B.

The Letters Had No Probative Value.
Rule 403 only applies to evidence "which is of

unquestioned relevance."

Id.

If the proffered evidence is not

relevant, it is not probative and cannot be admitted.

"A

precondition to exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is that it
be otherwise relevant . . . .

If it is not relevant, the

evidence is inadmissible under FRE 402, and Rule 403 never comes
into play."

Noel Shows, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327, 329

(11th Cir. 1983)(application of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence which is identical to Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence).
The issue at trial was whether or not Clarence had made
valid intervivos gifts of the Wyoco stock to Ray.
of an intervivos gift are:

(1)

The elements

the donor's present intent to

make the intervivos gift, and (2) the passing of possession and
control of the property to the donee.

Rule 401 of the Utah Rules

of Evidence defines "relevant evidence" as any "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."

The

letters do not bear on the issues of Clarence's intent and Rayfs
possession and control.
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Clarence.

The letters do not contain any expressions attributed

to Clarence or Ray regarding the gifts.

The letters merely

contain Morgan Jr.'s:
1.
hearsay recitation of hi interpretation of
Clarence's past business relations ip with Morgan Sr. ;
2.
hearsay and unsupported onclusory opinions
regarding what Clarence and Morgar Sr. intended to do
with Wyoco;
3.
hearsay and speculative onclusory opinions
regarding how Clarence intended tc dispose of his Wyoco
stock;
4.
unsupported belief that :larence would not
have given Ray the Wyoco stock by is Will and deprived
others of that stock;
5.
speculative conclusory c inions regarding how
Allen would have conducted himsell as a lawyer;
6.
legal conclusions regarc ng the effect of
Clarence's Will;
7.
claim that Morgan Jr. s) >uld have equal
control of the Wyoco stock;
8.
attempts to convince Ra: to associate
professionally with Morgan Jr. as Jlarence did with
Morgan Sr. in all of Clarence's cc itinuing business
ventures, including Wyoco;
9.
discussions of various ) isiness disputes
between Ray and Morgan Jr., but ui related to Wyoco; and
10. hearsay and unsupported accusations of
collateral misconduct by Ray and , len.
None of those matters had any tendency to m; :e Clarence's present
intent or Ray's possession and control more or less probable than
it would have been without the evidence.

101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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C.

The Letters Did Not Support The Theory For Which They Were
Proffered.
The Beneficiaries did not offer the letters to directly

defeat the elements of valid gifts.

The Beneficiaries offered

the letters to allegedly impeach Ray.
that Ray had changed his position.

The Beneficiaries alleged

(Tr. 2898.113-14, 19-20).

The Beneficiaries proffered that shortly after Clarence's death,
Ray declared he had received the Wyoco stock through Clarence's
Codicil exclusively and did not assert ownership through
intervivos gifts.

The Beneficiaries proffered that after Morgan

Jr. discovered that the Codicil was not witnessed and challenged
Ray's position, Ray claimed to have received the Wyoco stock
through two intervivos gifts.

The Beneficiaries offered the

letters to show that alleged change in position.
1.

The excluded portions of the letters do not show a

change of position —

After explaining the theory for which the

letters were allegedly offered, the trial court asked the
Beneficiaries to specify those portions of the letters which
supported their theory.

(Tr. 2898.26-27).

The Beneficiaries

identified the following:
In my recent discussions with you, you have indicated
to me that Clarence, by his Will, had given you all of
his stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. You
mentioned that this was contained in one of the
Amendments or Codicil to Clarence's Will. I have not
read it, but I assume what you say is the case.
(Tr. Ex. A ) .
I have a copy of Clarence's Will which Frank Allen gave
to me. It doesn't mention Wyoming Petroleum
Corporation stock. . . . There was never any mention
101590.mb.jr.aplbri4.ny
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that he was giving all of that stock to you. Yet you
tell me that you have an Amendment to the Will which
gives you all of the stock.
(Tr. Ex. B ) .
As I explained in my November 21 letter to you, a copy
of the Will that Frank gave to me never once mentions
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. . . .
Yet, you have told me many times that Clarence gave all
of that Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock to you by
an Amendment to the Will; and that Frank had the
Amendment.
(Tr. Ex. C ) . Exhibit C also enclosed a copy of Exhibit B.
But we have found that the Will, or the Codicil to the
Will, has some major defects, including the fact that
it was not witnessed. Frank Allen has one of the best
legal minds that I know; and no one knows better than
Frank that it requires two witnesses for the Will to be
legal. Therefore, I am certain that Frank did not
prepare the Will, even though Frank was Clarence's
lawyer. But I have to ask the question: Who did
prepare the Will, or the Codicil to the Will?
(Tr. Ex. D). Having identified those portions, the Beneficiaries
tacitly admitted that the remaining portions were not relevant.
The excluded portions do not address the gifts or the Codicil in
any way.

The excluded portions do not show a change of position.
2.

position —

The admitted portions do not show a change of

The portions identified by the Beneficiaries to

support their theory were admitted by the stipulation, either
verbatim or in substance.

(Tr. 2906.152-54).

The admitted

portions cannot show a change of position by Ray.
were written by Morgan Jr.
any admissions made by Ray.

The admitted portions do not contain
The admitted portions do not contain

any inconsistent statements made by Ray.

101590.mb.jr.aplbrief.ray
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The admitted portions

do not say Ray relied exclusively on the Codicil.

The letters,

including the admitted portions, simply show Morgan Jr.'s state
of mind, not Ray's.
3.
theory —

The evidence belied the Beneficiaries' proffered

Ray disclosed the gifts to Allen immediately after

Clarence's death.
Ray's testimony.

(Tr. 2907.101-04, 106-07).
(Tr. 2904.13-25).

Allen confirmed

The Beneficiaries did not

offer any evidence to contradict that testimony.
To prove their proffered theory, the Beneficiaries
relied exclusively on the testimony of Morgan Jr.

On direct

examination, Morgan Jr. testified he spoke with Ray shortly
before October 10, 1983 and that Ray claimed ownership of the
Wyoco stock by the Codicil and did not mention a gift.

(Tr.

2906.151-52, 154). On cross-examination, Morgan Jr. finally
admitted he spoke with Ray shortly after Clarence's death in July
1983.

(Tr. 2906.156-67).

Morgan Jr. further admitted that he

may have forgotten that Ray told him about the gifts.
2906.167-68).

(Tr.

Without evidence contradicting Ray's disclosure of

the gifts prior to Morgan Jr.'s letters, the letters cannot show
a change in position.
4.

No duty to disclose —

Even assuming Ray failed to

mention the gifts to Morgan Jr., Ray had no duty to disclose the
gifts to him.

Morgan Jr. was not Clarence's heir.

was not a beneficiary.

Morgan Jr.

Ray, not Morgan Jr., was the personal

representative of the Estate and Trustee of the Trust.
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Morgan

Jr. did not represent any of Clarence's heirs or beneficiaries,
Ray had no duty to disclose the gifts to Morgan Jr.
D.

The Beneficiaries Have Not Suffered Any Harm.
1.

The trial court considered the entire letters —

Prior to trial, Ray moved to strike the Beneficiaries' demand for
a jury.

(R. 2385-89).

(R. 2408-12).

The Beneficiaries opposed that motion.

The trial court denied the motion.

(R. 2415).

To

avoid error, the trial court acted as an independent factfinder,
in addition to the jury.

(Tr. 2905.187).

Although the letters

were not admitted to the jury in their entirety, the trial court
did consider them.

(Tr. 2905.188).

trial court ruled in Ray's favor.
2.
jury —

Despite the letters, the
(Tr. 2905.187-88).

Substance of the entire letters admitted to

Any alleged error was subsequently cured through the

admission of other evidence.

This Court has held that:

"Where

evidence is excluded by the trial court, any error which may have
resulted from such exclusion is cured where the substance of the
evidence is later admitted through some other means.11
Stephens, 667 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1983).

State v.

The substance of the

letters in their entirety was admitted to the jury.
The trial court compelled Ray to stipulate to the
substance of the alleged relevant portions of the letters.

(Tr.

2898.43-46, 48, 60). The written stipulation was admitted as
evidence to the jury.

(Tr. 2906.152-54).

Furthermore, Morgan

Jr. testified and Ray was thoroughly cross-examined about the
letters and the stipulated admissions.
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(Tr. 2907.83, 89-90,

2906.98-101, 113, 143-45, 150, 156-84).

Thus, the substance of

the excluded evidence was admitted through other means and any
alleged error has been cured.
3.

The letters were cumulative —

The Beneficiaries

did not suffer any prejudice because the letters were cumulative.
In Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), this
Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
excluding certain photos because they were cumulative.
548.

Morgan Jr.'s letters were cumulative.

Xd. at

The content of

Exhibits B, C and D simply repeats the content of Exhibit A.

In

addition, the writing and receipt of the letters were admitted.
Ray was compelled to admit the substance of the alleged relevant
portions.

The written stipulation was admitted.

his failure to respond.

Ray admitted

Morgan Jr. and Ray testified regarding

the letters, their content and Ray's failure to respond.
2907.83, 89-90, 2906.98-101, 113, 143-45, 150, 156-84).

(Tr.
The

letters could not have added anything to the Beneficiaries' case.
E.

Morgan Jr.'s Speculative Accusations of Collateral
Misconduct Would Have Seriously Prejudiced Ray.
The admission of the letters would have unfairly

prejudiced Ray.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . if it has a
tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by
improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's
sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, provokes
its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to
base its decision on something other than the
established propositions of the case.

101590.mb.jr.aplbnef.my
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Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314,
323, n. 31 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 678 P.2d 298 (1984).
See also State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989).
Speculative accusations and innuendoes of collateral misconduct
have no probative value and should not be admitted.

Coursen v.

A. H. Robbins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1985); Moe
v. Avions, Mareel Dassault-Brequet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 934
(10th Cir. 1984).
Morgan Jr.'s letters accused Ray of two acts of
misconduct.

First, Morgan Jr. accused Ray of misconduct in a

business transaction unrelated to the gifts.

Morgan Jr. had

challenged an oil deal of Justcofs, in which Ray and others had
personally invested while acting as directors of Justco.
Exs. B, C and D).

(Tr.

Second, Morgan Jr. implied that Ray unduly

influenced Clarence to obtain the control stock and to prepare
the Codicil giving Ray the Wyoco stock.

(Tr. Exs. B and D). All

issues regarding undue influence had been tried with the Removal
Issue and were excluded from the trial on the Gift Issue.
2898.4-9).

(Tr.

Morgan Jr.'s speculative accusations and innuendos of

collateral misconduct created a grave danger of prejudice and
confusion and were properly excluded.
CONCLUSION
The Beneficiaries have not demonstrated that the trial
court clearly transgressed all reasonable bounds of discretion in
denying them a new trial.
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assert the parol evidence rule and estoppel.

Neither theory is

applicable. Ray did not seek enforcement of the Codicil's terms
and the evidence did not contradict those terms, only a factual
recital.

The Beneficiaries failed to offer any evidence that Ray

concealed material facts from them to induce them to take a
course of action which resulted in their detriment.
The Beneficiaries have not demonstrated that the trial
court's application of Rule 403 was clearly unreasonable.
letters had no probative value.

The

The trial court admitted the

portions which were allegedly relevant.

Morgan Jr.'s testimony

contradicted the change of position allegedly established by his
letters.

The trial court considered the entire letters and the

substance of the letters was admitted to the jury through other
means.

The letters were cumulative and dangerously accused Ray

of unfounded misconduct unrelated to the gifts.
The Decree and Judgment on Verdict should be affirmed
and Appellee should be awarded his costs pursuant to Rule 34 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED:

December

/*/ , 1990.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

Palmer
fobinson
Attorneys for Appellee,
Raymond A. Ebert
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303 East 2100 South
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PETITION FOR
AND REMOVAL OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND
TRUSTEE AND APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR

In the Matter of the Estate of
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,
Deceased.

Probate No. P-83-695

?-

PETITIONER, The Saint Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish,

V

t

states and represents to the Court that:
1.

Clarence I. Justheim, deceased, as Grantor, and

|Raymond A. Ebert, as Trustee, entered into a trust agreement on
June 22, 1978 (the "Trust"), the Trustee of which Trust is the
sole beneficiary of the estate.

Attached hereto and incorporated

herein is a copy of what is^believed to be such trust and all of
t

the amendments thereto.
2.

Petitioner believes that it is a residuary

beneficiary of the Trust, and as such, is a person interested in
the estate and Trust.
3.

Raymond A. Ebert was appointed personal

representative of the decedent on July 22, 1983, by the Court in
informal proceedings.

LAW O F F I C E S

FABIAN & C L E N D E N I N
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

E I G H T H F L O O R C O N T I N E N T A L BANK B U I L O I N G

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

4.

Raymond A. Ebert is the named and acting Trustee of

the Trust•
5.

Cause for removal of Raymond A. Ebert as personal

representative and Trustee of the Trust exists because the best
interests of the estate and Trust would be served by such removal
in that Raymond A, Ebert, as personal representative and/or
Trustee, has apparently misappropriated valuable assets of the
estate and trust by causing such assets to be wrongfully
distributed to himself, and his wife and children.
6.

The following individuals, as heirs, designees and

beneficiaries of the Trust, are interested persons of the estate
and Trust, entitled to notice of the requested hearing:
NAME

RELATIONSHIP

ADDRESS

Margaret L. Justheim

Wife

123 2nd Avenue
Salt Lake City,
UT 84103

Raymond A. Ebert,
Trustee

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Estate

2338 East 3740 South
Salt Lake City, UT

Wendi Nicodemus

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Susie Nicodemus

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

David Nicodemus

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Genie H. Nicodemus

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

20 Chanell Lake
Tiburon, CA 94920
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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

E I G H T H FLOOR C O N T I N E N T A L BANK B U I L D I N G

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101
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Robert Mattison

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Randy Mattison

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Scott Mattison

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Margaret Mattison

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Raymond E. Ebert

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

2338 East 3740 South
Salt Lake City, UT

Charles Justheim

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Madeline Harris

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Patricia Justin

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

Unknown

Barbara Stottern

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

3507 Wrangler Way
Park City, UT 84060

Saint Mark's
Episcopal Cathedral
Parish

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

231 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT

Dean of
Saint Mark's
Episcopal Cathedral
Parish

Residuary
Beneficiary of
the Trust

231 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT

7.

c/o J. Richard Bell, Esq.
303 East 2100 South

The statements in the application or petition for

appointment of informal probate are hereby adopted except to the
extent that they relate to the qualification and priority of
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Raymond A. Ebert and except to the partial list of individuals
entitled to notice,
8,

First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., formerly Walker

Bank and Trust, is qualified to succeed as personal representative
and has priority because there is no other person with a prior or
equal right.

Walker Bank and Trust is nominated in the decedentfs

will as successor personal representative,
9,

First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. is qualified to

succeed as Trustee and has equal priority because no successor
Trustee has been named in the Trust.
10,

Petitioner has been informed that other

beneficiaries of the Trust will consent and join in this petition.
WHEREFORE, petitioner requests that:
1.

The Court fix a time and place for hearing.

2.

The Court designate what persons, if any, are to be

given notice of the petition and hearing in addition to Raymond A.
Ebert, personal representative.
3.

Raymond A. Ebert be removed as personal

representative and as Trustee.
4.

First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. be appointed as

successor personal representative and, upon qualification and
acceptance, be issued letters.
5.

First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. be appointed as

successor Trustee.
6.

Raymond A. Ebert be required to prepare and submit an

accounting and to deliver all of the assets and records of the
-4LAW O F F I C E S
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estate and Trust respectively to First Interstate Bank of Utah,
N.A. and petitioner.
DATED this

^

day of

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
a Professional Corporation

Ju*v£~

1984.

THE SAINT MARK'S EPISCOPAL
CATHEDRAL PARISH

AfL

By.UjV&JUCiAAN^-. Mk ^t>u^^ vV-^

fay/B. Bell
'Attorneys for Petitioner

VERIFICATION
JTATE OF UTAH

)

ss.

COUNTY OF

The petitioner, being sworn, says that the facts set
forth in the foregoing petition are accurate and complete to the
best of the petitioner's knowledge and belief.
THE SAINT MARK'S EPISCOPAL
CATHEDRAL PARISH
By IbajLLoLAA^t:.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the
of ^ / ^

|V

•>*»>.

uj-e

±Ls

/"^day

, 1984.

t ^ J ^ w ,

c//cix

My Commission Expires:

*/**/* ?
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ORDER SETTING DATE FOR HEARING AND FOR NOTICE
IT IS ORDERED that the hearing requested in the foregoing
petition be held on the

day of

, 1984f at

.m. , in this Court, and that notice of such hearing be given
to all interested persons in the manner required by the Utah
Uniform Probate Code.
DATED this

day of

, 1984.
BY THE COURT

District Judge
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FILER DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Joseph J. Palmer (#2505),
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of
M0YLE & DRAPER, P.C.
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Telephone: (801) 521-0250
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
of

SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL ORDER

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,
Deceased.

Probate No, 83-695
Judge Michael R. Murphy

On Thursday, June 8, 1989, a pretrial conference was
held before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy pursuant to Rule 16
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Joseph J. Palmer and

Jeffrey Robinson appeared as counsel for Raymond A. Ebert,
personal representative.

J. Richard Bell appeared as legal

counsel for respondents, Priscilla Knight, as personal
representative of the Estate of Charles Justheim, Madelaine L.
Harris, Patricia J. Brown, St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish
and Dean of St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral Parish.
action was taken:

mb.jrjupp-lor.dj

The following

This matter arises by reason of the heirs1 Removal
Petition and Mr. Ebert's Objections thereto.

Notice thereof was

given all interested parties and they were thereafter placed on
this Court's trial calendar.

To assist the Court in framing the

applicable issues for trial before the Court, the parties
submitted a Pretrial Order on October 30, 1984.
attached as Exhibit A.

A copy is

On May 26, 1986, the heirs submitted and

all parties agreed to a proposed amendment to the Pretrial Order.
A copy is attached as Exhibit B.

The Removal Petition and the

Pretrial Orders framed two issues:

(1) the removal of Mr. Ebert

as personal representative of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim;
and (2) the challenge to two intervivos gifts to Mr. Ebert of
151,143 shares of stock in Wyoming Petroleum Company.

Mr.

Ebert's objections to the Removal Petition prayed for
confirmation of the Wyoco stock gifts to him.
Prior to trial in 1986, the parties stipulated that the
Court might reserve for later determination the issue of whether
Mr. Justheim made valid intervivos gifts of the Wyoming Petroleum
Company common stock to Mr. Ebert, and that the parties might
offer further evidence on that issue, and the court so ordered
(see pg. 3 of Findings of Fact of 7/31/86).

On May 27, 28, 29,

30, June 3, 23, 25, July 21 and 28, 1986, this Court tried the
issue of Mr. Ebert's removal as personal representative based on
the issues as framed by the amended Pretrial Order.

On July 31,

1986, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered which
resolved the issues relating to Mr. Ebert's removal as personal

mb.jrjupp-tor.cij
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representative,

A copy is attached as Exhibit C.

Based on the

October 30, 1984 Pretrial Order, the May 26, 1986 Amendment and
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by this Court
on July 31, 1986, the only issues of fact now before this Court
are paragraphs A through H of Section IV and the only issues of
law now before the Court are paragraphs A through D and F of
Section V of the Pretrial Order of October 30, 1984.
DATED:

June

f

1989.
BY THE COURT:

f.
The Honorable Michael' R.
District Court Judge

APPROVED BY:
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

Jd's^h/J. /Palmer
/Jef/rey Rotfinson
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert,
Personal Representative
BELL & BELL

'^LLJLJ/^SLXJL
f J\. Richard Bell
Attorney for Heirs and
^ Beneficiaries
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June _ £ _ , 1989, a copy of the
Supplemental Pretrial Order was hand-delivered to:
J. Richard Bell
BELL & BELL
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Attorneys for Heirs and
Beneficiaries
Kent M. Kasting
DART, ADAMSON AND KASTING
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Douglas C. Mortensen
MATHESON, JEPPSON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Clark P. Giles
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

&
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of

:

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,

:

PRETRIAL ORDER

:

Civil No. P-83-695

Deceased.
__

_j

___:

(Judge Fishier)

IT IS ORDERED:
I.

Petitioners seek in this Action to:
A.

Recover from respondent Raymond A. Ebert (hereinafter

"Ebert") and his donees, for the benefit of the Estate of Clarence
I. Justheim, 151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum stock claimed to
have been the subject of a gift from Clarence I. Justheim
(hereinafter "Justheim") to Ebert.
B.

Remove Ebert as Trustee of each of the Trusts created

or to be created pursuant to the Justheim intervivos trust, dated
June 22, 1978, as amended (hereinafter collectively the "Justheim
Trust").
C.

Remove Ebert as personal representative of the Estate

of Clarence I. Justheim (hereinafter the "Justheim Estate").
II.

Contentions of the Parties:
A.

Petitioners claim:

(1) that Ebert improperly caused

151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, assets of either

EXHIBIT A

the Justheim Estate or the Justheim Trust, to be transferred into
his and his donees' names; (2) that said stock was never given to
Ebert by Justheim either during Justheim's life or by a valid
testimentary transfer; (3) that Ebert obtained possession of the
stock certificates either in his capacity as trustee to the
Justheim Trust, as confidential advisor or fiduciary to Justheim,
as conservator to Justheim, or as personal representative to the
Justheim Estate; (4) that in the event Justheim did give all or
part of said stock to Ebert, such gift or gift were made as a
result of undue influence by Ebert in his position as trustee,
confidential advisor or fiduciary to Justheim, or that said gift
or gifts were given to Ebert not in his individual capacity, but
as trustee of the Justheim Trust, or that such gift or gifts were
not intended by Justheim to take effect until after Justheim's
death; (5) that Ebert, as personal representative of the Justheim
Estate, should have sought court approval of the alleged gifts
prior to the transfer of said shares into Ebert1s and his donees1
names; (6) that Ebert, as personal representative, has committed
misfeasance in his untimely filing of a federal gift tax return
reporting the alleged gift or gifts and in the valuation of said
stock contained in said gift tax return; (7) that Ebert has
otherwise misrepresented the value of said stock in documents
filed with the Court; and (8) that Ebert should be removed as
personal representative of the Justheim Estate as trustee of the
Justheim Trust as a result of the above actions.
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B.

Respondent claims:
This proceeding is instigated by John H. Morgan, Jr.

("Morgan") who directly or through his attorneys, solicited the
Petitioners to file the Petition and is paying all costs and
attorneys' fees, Morgan did so because Ebert is unwilling to
invest Justheim funds he controls in fiduciary capacities in
Morgan dominated enterprises as decedent did during his life.
Morgan considers it to be in his business interest to effect the
removal of Ebert from all fiduciary capacities in which he makes
or will make investment decisions with respect to assets owned by
decedent at the time of his death.

In particular, respondent

claims:
1. That he had known Justheim and been associated in
business ventures with him for approximately 40 years before
Justheim1s death.
2.

During the last 5 years of Justheim's life (after

Justheim was injured in a 1978 car accident), respondent
voluntarily, without compensation, went to Justheim's home on a
daily basis and assisted him in business and personal affairs
including care for Justheim's invalid and incompetent wife, and
respondent considered himself to be Justheim's closest personal
friend.
3. Justheim had no children and for many years had had
no significant contact or continuing relationship with any members
of his immediate family, except his wife. Justheim adequately
provided for his wife in his will and respondent promised Justheim
-3-

he would watch over Justheim's wife.

Hence, respondent was a

natural object of Justheim's bounty.
4.

Justheim, on his own account, for that of Justheim

Petroleum Company, in which he had a controlling stock position
and as a director of Wyoming Petroleum Company ("Wyco"), had
invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in Morgan dominated
enterprises between 1975 and 1983; and none of those investments
had been the source of any return by the time of Justheim's
death.

Morgan frequently visited Justheim after the 1978 car

accident when Justheim was confined to his home.

Morgan was the

dominant person in a confidential relationship with Justheim; he
intimidated and bullied Justheim and influenced him unfairly to
take actions favorable to Morgan.

Justheim was afraid and

resentful of Morgan, recognized he was being manipulated by
Morgan, and planned to assure that Morgan's domination of
Justheim's estate did not continue beyond Justheim's death.
5.

Justheim and John Morgan, Sr., Morgan's father, had

each owned or controlled the same number of Wyco shares and
together held about 90% of its outstanding stock.

After Morgan

Sr.'s death in February of 1982, Justheim purchased additional
Wyco stock to control it, and thereafter Morgan hounded Justheim
to sell him one-half the additional stock.

Justheim acquired the

stock to prevent Morgan from raiding Wyco's treasury for Morgan's
limited partnerships, and his desire to assure that result as well
as his desire to show appreciation for Ebert's friendship
motivated Justheim to make the gifts here in question.
-4-

6.

Justheim gave his Wyco stock to Ebert by handing him

120,431 shares around May 15, 1981 and 30,712 shares about May 4,
1982 (the former were endorsed off, the latter were not) and
expressed donative intent in each case, and he directed Ebert not
to have the shares transferred into his hame until after
Justheim's death, but to keep the gift secret so that Justheim
would not have to endure repeated confrontation with Morgan, Jr.
; The transfer of the stock was not a matter of practical
consequence because Wyco had not held shareholders meetings, paid
dividends or held formal directors meetings for many years. The
Wyco stock was only a small portion of Justheim's estate.
7. Justheim discussed his intent to make such gifts and
his motives with his attorney, Frank J. Allen, and they seemed
perfectly appropriate to Allen. Allen had such a relationship
with Justheim that Allen would have spoken up if the gifts had not
seemed appropriate.
8.

The 5/29/81 codicil to Justheim's will, which gave to

Ebert all of Justheim's Wyco stock, while invalid as a codicil
i because it is not witnessed, further evidences the gifts, and when
I Justheim made the second gift in 1982, he told Ebert that
endorsement was not necessary because of the codicil.
J

9.

Ebert was not a fiduciary of Justheim's until April,

1983 when he was appointed conservator of Justheim's estate,
though Ebert in 1978 signed Justheim's Trust Agreement to
establish, for $25.00, a "pourover" trust to receive the residue
I of Justheim's estate on his death.

10.

Shortly after Justheim's death, Ebert discussed the

facts surrounding the Wyco stock gifts with Allen, and concurred
with Allen's advice that those facts would be submitted to the
Probate Court for a determination as to the validity of the gifts
when the Inventory was filed.

The Inventory was complicated,

appraisals of the inventoried assets were difficult to obtain,
delaying the filing of the Inventory until November, 1984.
11.

The Inventory, and the estate and gift tax returns,

while signed by Ebert, were prepared under the direction and
advice of Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs and Cahoon, Frank J. Allen and
Richard C. Cahoon in particular as counsel, and DeNiro & Thorne,
Certified Public Accountants, and the valuations stated therein
represent their advice and are reasonable valuations for the
purposes intended thereby.
12.

Morgan, Jr., upon learning of the gift of the Wyco

stock to Ebert went to Jay B. Bell of Fabian & Clendenin, his
longstanding counsel, to see about attacking it with the object
being to create a claim to remove Ebert as trustee, which would
result in Ebert's removal as President of Wyco and of Justheim
Petroleum, in which Morgan was an investor and director until
Ebert caused him to be removed, that Morgan, Jr. is in fact paying
the fees of Fabian & Clendenin in prosecuting this demand petition
in the name of Fabian's longstanding client, ST. Mark's Cathedral;
and the other petitioners are represented by J.R. Bell, father of
Jay B. Bell.
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13.

Justheim intended and desired that Ebert be his

personal representative and trustee at the time he made gifts of
the Wyco stock, and that regardless of the validity of the gifts,
no grounds exist for removal of Ebert because Justheim, having
been fully aware of the potential conflict between Morgan, Jr. and
Ebert as to the ownership and control of Wyco, nevertheless
appointed him trustee and therefore Ebert may be removed only for
demonstrated abuse of power detrimental to the trust, and not
merely because he claims the gift. Respondent claims that in
answering ownership of the stock, he is carrying out the intent of
Justheim in keeping the stock from the influence and control of
Morgan.
III.

Uncontested Facts:
A.

On June 22, 1978, Clarence I. Justheim, as trustor,

and Ebert as trustee, created a $25.00 "pour-over" trust,
identified above as the "Justheim Trust".
B.

On June 22, 1978, Justheim also executed a Last Will

and Testament (hereinafter the "Justheim Will"), under which Ebert
was named to serve as personal representative of the Justheim
Estate upon Justheim's death.
C. Under the Justheim Will, all of Justheim's property,
except his personal effects and property previously transferred to
the Justheim Trust during Justheim's life, was bequeathed to Ebert
as Trustee of the Justheim Trust, to be administered and
distributed by Ebert according to the terms of said Trust.
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D.

Petitioners are beneficiaries under the Justheim

E.

On June 22, 1978, Justheim owned 127,743 shares of

Trust.

Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock represented by the following
certificates:
CERTIFICATE NO.

NO. OF SHARES

139
207
233
271
273
279
138
219
231
245

1
15,000
730
22,500
9,712
8,963
30,000
8,025
25,000
500

297

7,312
127,743

F.

In the spring of 1982, Justheim acquired an

additional 23,400 shares of Wyoming Petroleum stock as follows:
CERTIFICATE NO.

NO. OF SHARES

301

3,400

302

20,000
23,400

G.

On April 13, 1983, Ebert was appointed Guardian of

the Person and Conservator of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim,
a protected person.
H.

Justheim died on July 3, 1983.

I.

Following the death of Clarence Justheim the Justheim

Will was informally probated and Ebert informally appointed as
personal representative of the Justheim Estate.

-8-
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At such time, a typewritten document purporting to be

a codicil to the Justheim Will (hereinafter the "codicil11) was
given to the Court but was not informally probated.

The codicil

is dated May 29, 1981, is unwitnessed and purports to bequeath to
Ebert all of Justheim1s stock in Wyoming Petroleum Corporation.
K.

On or about October 24, 1983, Ebert delivered all of

the above-described certificates of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation
stock to the transfer agent and asked that they be, and they were,
transferred into Ebert1 s name and into the names of various
members of his family.

Ebert now claims that he and his family

own the stock.
L.

On October 3, 1984, Ebert as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim signed and caused to be
filed with the IRS a Federal Gift Tax Return prepared by Clyde &
Pratt, and John Deniro, pertaining to the alleged 1981 gift of
120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock, which
return valued said stock at $30,108.
M.

On October 16, 1984, Ebert as Personal Representative

of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim filed with the Court an
Inventory of the property of said Estate, prepared by Clyde &
Pratt, and John DeNiro which says Ebert claims that Justheim gave
to Ebert 120,431 shares of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock in
the Spring of 1981, and an additional 30,712 shares in the Spring
of 1982. Said stock is valued at $37,826.00 in said Inventory.
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IV.

Contested Issues of Fact:
A.

Did Justheim deliver to Ebert any of the stock

certificates in controversy with the present intent to make a gift
of such stock to Ebert?
B.

Did Justheim intend that any gift or gifts not take

effect until Justheim's death?
C.

Was Ebert a person to whom Justheim would naturally

give such stock; does any evidence, independent of Ebert1s
possession of the certificates, exist to corrobrate the gift?
D*

Did Ebert accept dominion and control over said stock

at the time any gift or gifts were made or attempted?
E.

If Justheim gave any of the stock certificates to

Ebert, was Justheim intending to make a gift to Ebert individually
or to Ebert as trustee of the Justheim Trust?
F.

Did Ebert procure any transfer of stock by exercising

undue influence over Justheim?
G.

Was Ebert a fiduciary to, a confidential advisor to,

or in a confidential relationship with Justheim?
H.

If there were any gift or gifts of stock from

Justheim to Ebert, were the gifts fair in all respects?
I.

Did Ebert fail to exercise reasonable care as a

fiduciary in administering Justheim1s estate?
J.

Did Ebert act in conflict of interest in

administering Justheim1s estate?
K.

Has Ebert misstated the value of the stock in the

Inventory filed with the Court and in the Federal Gift Tax Return?
-10-

L.

Has Ebert acted improperly in his untimely filing of

the gift tax return reporting said alleged gift?
M.

Is this removal petition in fact processed by John H.

Morgan, Jr. to further his own business interest?
V.

Contested Issues of Law:
A. Were there any effective inter vivos gifts of stock

of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation from Justheim to Ebert.
B.

At the times the alleged gifts were made, did Ebert

owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care to Clarence Justheim and
to the Justheim Trust?
C.

Are the claimed gifts of stock presumptively invalid

by reason of Ebertfs relationship with Justheim.
D.

Are the claimed gifts of stock presumed to be a

transfer to Ebert as trustee rather than a gift to Ebert
individually?
E.

Does reasonable cause exist for Ebert's removal as

Trustee of the Justheim Trust and as Personal Representative of
the Justheim Estate.
F.

Are the gifts presumptively valid from Ebert's

possession of the certificates and other surrounding circumstances?
VI.

Exhibits:
All exhibits shall be exchanged by the parties prior to

trial.
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VII.

Witnesses:
A,

Petitioners
1.

2.

3.

Petitioners will call the following witnesses:
a.

Raymond A. Ebert

b.

Frank Allen

c.

Michael Bennion

Petitioners may call the following witnesses:
a.

John Morgan

b.

Richard Cahoon

c.

John DeNiro

d.

Steven White

e.

Wayne Elggren

f.

Dr. John Henrie

Petitioners may use the following depositions:
a.

B.
I

« VIII.

IX.

Dr. John Henrie

Respondent may call any of the above, and
a.

Florence Tierney

b.

Fran Albreicht

Discovery is complete.

Trial Briefs are to be filed with the Clerk and copies

furnished to opposing counsel by
This matter is set for pretrial conference on
Estimated time of trial is four days.
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X.

The foregoing admissions having been made by the parties, and

the parties having specified the foregoing issues of fact and law
remaining to be litigated, this order shall supplement the
pleadings and govern the course of the trial of this case, unless
modified to prevent manifest injustice.
DATED this

day of

, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
APPROVED:

w.

Cullen Battle

J. Richard Bell

Joseph J. Palmer

Frank J. Allen
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J. RICHARD BELL
JACQUE B. BELL
BELL & BELL
303 East 2100 South

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84115
Telephone 487-7756
Attorneys for Heirs and Beneflciarles_
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

)

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,

)

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT TO
PRE-TRIAL ORDER

)

Probate No. P-83-695

Deceased.

The Honorable Philip R. Fishier
Notice is hereby given that the attorneys for Priscilla
Knight as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Justheira,
Madelalne L.

Harris, Patricia J. Brown; and two of the beneficiaries

under the trust: Dean of St. Marks Episcopal Cathedral Parish and
St. Marks Episcopal Cathedral Parish, move to amend the Pre-Trial
Order entered by this Court on the 30th day of October, 1984, at
page 2 by adding the following:
(9)

Ebert has misrepresented the size of the estate to the

heirs and beneficiaries;
(10) Ebert failed to give notice to heirs and beneficiaries
as required by law.
(11) Ebert has been deceptive and secretive and has followed
a course of conduct in his capacity as Personal Representative as
above set forth which is not in the best interests of the Estate.
(12) Ebertfs many positions as Personal Representative
EXHIBIT B

and Trustee under the Trust of the Estate of Clarence I. Justhelm,
Personal Representative and Trustee under the Trust of the Estate
of Margaret Justheira;

Conservator and Guardian of Margaret Justheim;

stockholder, President and Director of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation;
stockholder, President and Director of Justheira Petroleum Corporation;
causes him, Ebert, to be in so many potentially conflicting interests
situations as to require his removal as being in the best Interests
of the Estate.
Oral notice of this proposed Amendment has been given to
adverse party in keeping with the Court's oral Order to respond to
to oral Interrogatories.
Dated this 26th day of May, 1986.
BELL 8c BELL, by

J . RfcEarcJ BelT

MAILING_CERTIFICATE
A true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this 26th
day of May, 1986, postage prepaid, to the following:
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq.
Moyle Sc Draper
600 Deseret Plaza
If 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
W. Cullen Battle Esq.
Fabian and Clendenin
12th Floor
215 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-2309
-2-

and
Frank J. Allen, Esq.
Clyde, Pratt, Glbbs S. Cahoon
77 West 72nd South, No. 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Joseph J. Palmer (#2505) of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
Attorneys for Raymond A. Ebert
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1901
Telephone (801) 521-0250

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,
Deceased.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Probate No. P-83-695
(The Honorable Philip R.
Fishier)

* * * * * * *

This action came on regularly for trial before the
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, sitting without a jury, on May 27,
28, 29, 30, and June 3, for closing argument on June 23, for
the Court's initial ruling on June 25, and for further argument
and the Court's final ruling on July 21 and 28, 1986.
Richard Bell appeared for certain Beneficiaries:

J.

Priscilla

Knight as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles
Justheim, Madelaine L. Harris, Patricia J. Brown, St. Mark's

EXHIBIT C

ADDENDUM - A

Episcopal Cathedral Parish and Dean of St. Mark's Episcopal
Cathedral (hereafter "Knight-Church").

Kent M. Kasting

appeared for himself as Guardian Ad Litem for Margaret L.
Justheim, a Beneficiary,

Clark P. Giles appeared for

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Beneficiary.

Frank J.

Allen appeared for Raymond A. Ebert, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim.

Joseph J. Palmer

appeared for Raymond A. Ebert, as Personal Representative and
as an individual (hereafter "Ebert").

The action came on based upon the Petition of Knight-Church
for Removal of Raymond A. Ebert as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Clarence I. Justheim (hereafter "Estate") and as
Trustee of the inter vivos trusts created or to be created
pursuant to the Justheim Trust dated June 22, 1978, as amended
(hereafter "Trust"), and further based upon the Pretrial Order
of October 30, 1984 as supplemented by the Knight-Church Notice
of Amendment, dated May 26, 1986.

At the inception of trial, Charles M. Bennett appeared for
John M. Morgan, Jr. (-Morgan").
of Morgan to appear.

Ebert objected to the standing

Based upon the oral stipulation of all

parties in open court, the issue of Morgan's standing was
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reserved, and he was permitted to appear for the limited
purpose of joining in the Knight-Church Removal Petitions.

The

latter and Morgan are hereafter referred to as "Petitioners".

The parties stipulated that the Court would reserve and not
now determine the issue of whether Clarence I. Justheim made
valid inter vivos gifts of 151,143 shares of Wyoming Petroleum
Company ("Wyoco*) common stock to Ebert and that the parties
might offer further evidence on that issue.

These Findings and

Conclusions are not intended to be the findings and conclusions
on that issue.

Petitioners did, however, offer evidence on

their claims that one reason, among others, Ebert should be
removed is because the gifts of the Wyoco stock were invalid.

Based upon the evidence, and the parties having rested and
submitted memoranda and closing argument, and the Court being
fully advised, the Court now makes and enters these:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The Parties established the following facts by a

preponderance of the evidence:
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A.
many years,

Ebert was Clarence's closest personal friend for
Ebert began working for Clarence as "an

administrative assistant, courier, confidant and general

right

hand man'- (Exhibit 32) in late 1978 following an automobile
accident involving Clarence.

Mr. Ebert continued in that

capacity until Clarence's death in July 1983.
B.

In helping Clarence, Ebert assumed a position of

some trust and confidential responsibility.

Clarence depended

on Ebert for many business and personal matters and trusted him
without reservation.

Ebert did not have a position of

superiority or dominance over Clarence.
C.

Clarence's foremost concern in the last few years

of his life was the care of his wife Margaret.

Margaret was

substantially incapable of taking care of her affairs during
the relevant time period.
D.
of Margaret.

Clarence was concerned that he could not take care
Clarence sought the help of friends and

associates.
E.

Clarence was a demanding and dominating person.

As he grew older, he became increasingly difficult to work
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with.

As a result, several nurses hired after his accident in

November 1978 quit their jobs.
F.

In order to induce people to help him, Clarence

began to make promises to his friends and associates in order
to obtain their cooperation.
G.

With regard to Ebert, Clarence stated on several

occasions that he would take care of Ebert.
H.

On May 29, 1981, Clarence executed a document

purported*to be a codicil which he had asked Ebert to type.
The purported codicil devised all of Clarence's Wyoming
Petroleum stock to Ebert.

However, the codicil was not

witnessed.
I.
to Clarence.

The Wyoming Petroleum stock was a valuable asset
Early in 1981, Clarence asked his attorney, Frank

Allen, if he could make a gift of Wyoco stock to Ebert without
transferring it on the corporate books because Clarence did not
want Morgan to know of it.

Allen told Clarence he could make a

valid gift of stock by handing Ebert the certificates and
declaring that he was giving it to him, and that the
certificates should be endorsed or a stock power should be
given.

Clarence never again discussed a gift of Wyoco Stock

with Allen.
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J.

After Clarence died, Ebert learned from Frank

Allen, who was appointed as his attorney as personal
representative of the estate, that the codicil was invalid for
lack of witnesses.
K.

Ebert claimed that Clarence gave him 120,431

shares of Wyoco stock on May 15, 1981, which left Clarence with
6,312 shares.

Ebert claimed Clarence told him not to transfer

the certificates into his name until after his death and to
keep the fact of the gifts secret because Clarence did not want
Morgan to find out about the gifts.
L.

John Morgan, Sr. ("Morgan Sr.") died in February

1982; then he, family members and others and Clarence, his
family members and others, each owned approximately the same
number of shares of Wyoco.
M.

Immediately following Morgan Sr.'s death, Clarence

determined that the agreement between him and Morgan Sr. to
keep an equal number of shares was no longer valid, and
Clarence further determined to obtain additional stock of Wyoco
in order to obtain control of the corporation.
N.

Ebert assisted Clarence in this endeavor by

checking shareholder lists and by making several trips to
Wyoming to obtain 20,000 shares of stock and an additional
3,400 shares from New Jersey which represented the -control
stock-.
- 6 -

O.

Shortly after the •'control stock" was obtained by

Clarence, Ebert claimed Clarence gave Ebert an additional
30,712 shares of Wyoco.

These shares represented the -control

stock- and the remaining 6,312 shares of the stock remaining
with Clarence after the claimed first gift.

Ebert claimed

Clarence again told him not to transfer the certificates into
his name and to keep the fact of the gifts secret because
Clarence did not want Morgan to find out about the gifts.
P.

Both Ebert and Allen testified that, in July or

August 1983, Ebert told Allen the facts about the purported
gifts.

Allen told Ebert that in his opinion, if the Court

determined the facts to be as Ebert claimed, each of the gifts
was probably valid even if unendorsed and that the codicil had
some probative value to prove the gifts.

Allen told Ebert,

however, that all of the facts would have to be disclosed to
the Court and the Court would have to determine if the gifts
were valid.

Neither Ebert nor Allen disclosed the facts

surrounding the alleged gifts to either the court or the
ultimate beneficiaries of the estate until after a petition was
brought by St. Mark's Church in June 1984, seeking the recovery
of the stock and Ebert's removal as personal representative of
the estate.
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Q.

Without approval of the Court or notice to his

attorney or the estate's ultimate beneficiaries, Ebert
transferred the disputed stock to himself and members of his
family on October 24, 1983,

When he did so, Ebert believed

that he and Allen would cause all of the facts supporting
Ebert's gift claims to be submitted to and determined by the
Court,

In October 1984, Ebert and his family caused all of the

stock to be deposited with Allen pending this Court's final
determination of the gift claims.
R.

To transfer the stock to himself and his family,

Ebert delivered the disputed stock certificates to the transfer
agent for Wyoming Petroleum with two letters dated October 24,
1983.

Some of the stock certificates presented for transfer

had not been endorsed.

Ebert included a copy of the codicil

which Ebert knew was invalid.

Ebert referred to the codicil in

the letter that accompanied the unsigned stock certificates and
stated that:

-The Codicil bequeathed to me all of Clarence I.

Justheim's interest in Wyoming Petroleum Corp."

Ebert intended

that the transfer agent rely upon the codicil in transferring
the stock to Ebert.

Ebert was relying on the advice Allen had

given him in July or August 1983 in so doing.
S.

Ebert is currently the personal representative of

the estate, the conservator of Margaret Justheim's estate, the
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largest individual shareholder in Justheim Petroleum (other
than the estate), the president and a director of Justheim
Petroleum, and the president and a director of Wyoming
Petroleum.

Clarence anticipated and intended Ebert would be

the personal representative of his estate.
T.

Allen is currently the secretary, a director and a

shareholder of Justheim Petroleum, the attorney for Justheim
Petroleum, the attorney for Ebert as personal representative of
the estate, and the attorney for Ebert as the conservator of
Margaret Justheim.

Allen was secretary, a director and a

shareholder of Justheim Petroleum during Clarence's life, and
was Clarence's personal attorney.

2.

The Petitioners failed to prove the following

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence:

A.

That Ebert improperly caused 151,143 shares of

Wyoco common stock to be transferred into his and his donees'
names.
B.

That Wyoco stock was never given to Ebert by

Clarence during Clarence's life, that the Wyoco stock was given
to Ebert in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, or that these
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gifts were intended by Clarence to take effect after Clarence's
death.
C.

That these gifts were made as a result of undue

influence by Ebert in his position as trustee, confidential
advisor or fiduciary to Clarence.
D.

That Ebert, as Personal Representative of the

Justheim Estate, should have sought court approval of the
alleged gifts prior to the transfer of the Wyoco shares into
Ebert's and his donees' names.
E.

That the Petitioners were damaged by Ebert#s

transfer of the Wyoco stock to himself and his donees.
F.

That Ebert, as Personal Representative, committed

misfeasance with regard to the time of filing of a federal gift
tax return reporting the alleged gift or gifts and in the
valuation of the Wyoco stock in the gift tax return.
G.

That Ebert otherwise misrepresented the value of

the Wyoco stock in documents filed with the Court.
H.

That Ebert misrepresented the size of the estate

to the heirs and beneficiaries.
I.

That Ebert failed to give notice to heirs and

beneficiaries as required by law.
J,

That Ebert has been deceptive, misleading,

secretive, or has followed a course of conduct in his capacity

- 10 -

a Personal Representative which is not in the best interests of
the EstateK.

That Ebert's positions as Personal Representative

and Trustee of the Estate and the Trust of Clarence I.
Justheim, Personal Representative and Trustee of the Estate and
the Trust of Margaret Justheim, Conservator and Guardian of
Margaret Justheim, stockholder, president and director of
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, stockholder, president and
director of Justheim Petroleum Corporation, are such
potentially conflicting interests as to require his removal in
the best interests of the Estate.
L.

That Ebert has failed to timely pursue and

discover assets and potential assets of the Estate,
M,

That Ebert has failed to account for assets or

potential assets of the Estate.
N.

That Ebert has attempted to conceal or cover up

the basis of his claim to the gifts of Wyoco stock.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters these:

- 11 -

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ebert did not haw? a confidential relationship with

£/.

The Court concludes that the Petitioners have failed

f

to show by a preponderance of the evidence:
A.

that Ebert has breached any duty to the estate; or

B.

that it is in the best interests of the Estate of

Clarence I. Justheim that Ebert be removed as Personal
Representative of the Estate or as Trustee of the
Trusts created by Clarence I. Justheim under Trust
>nt dated June 22, 1978, as amended.
ThereTcTre/ "the Petition to remove Ebert should be denied.

Dated

3 / , n&<>

BY THE COURT

p R. Fishier
CDN3660B

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
Li
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VCUFPK
Ooput/Ciork

I- hereby certify that a Liue and Correct: OOpy ot
.^•e-rcgmhlj 1:1ND1NG3 OF FACT and CQMCLU3ION3 OF LAW
dolivorod

wre—t«nd

day of July,—19 86 j—to tho follow

f^ff^^^^
Joseph J. Palmer
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
#15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

**2-~~^fi T A ^ ^ ^

c^>-A
.11

Frank J. Allen
S^Af
f~I
CLYDE & PRATT
yf/C6^^'
)
77 West 200 South, ^/ttte 200 <*/
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Kent M. Kasting
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
48 Post Office Place, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
J. Richard Bell
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84115

Clark P. Giles
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dale F. Gardiner
1325 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah

%$/M

84115

Carmen E. Kipp
KIPP Sc CHRISTIAN
32 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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qpfEWpy^
Joseph J. Palmer (#2505), and
Jeffrey Robinson (#4129), of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
Attorneys for Raymond A, Ebert
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Telephone: (801) 521-0250

FILED 0ISTRIST COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 1 5 1989

Deputy Cierk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
STIPULATION
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,
Deceased,

Probate No. 83-695
(Gift Issue)
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Reserving objections as to relevancy, hearsay, unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading to the jury and waste
of time, Raymond A. Ebert stipulates that John H. Morgan, Jr.
wrote to Raymond A, Ebert in substance as follows:
10/10/83: In my recent discussions with you,
you have indicated to me that Clarence, by
his Will or a Codicil, had given you all of
his stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation.
11/21/83: I have
which Frank Allen
Wyoming Petroleum
have an Amendment
all of the stock.

a copy of Clarence's Will,
gave me; it doesn't mention
stock. Yet you tell me you
to the Will which gives you

1/8/84: The Codicil is not witnessed; a
Codicil requires two witnesses to be valid,
so I doubt Frank Allen prepared it. Who
prepared the Codicil?

DATED:

June

JI

1989.
MOYLE fit DRAPER,

By

^

P.C

V

Jos(eph J. P&lmer
Jeffrey Robinson
Attorneys for Raymond A.
Ebert
Accepted:
BELL & BELL

J- Richard Bell
Attorneys for Certain
Beneficiaries
STIPULATION ACCEPTED.
DATED:

June

' /

. 1989.
BY THE COURT:

By
flonorable
District

M i c h a e l R. Murphy
Court Judge

f!H9r<K
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

ORDER

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,

CASE NO. P-83-695

Deceased.

The motion for a new trial on the gift issue is denied,
Dated this

o

day of August, 1989.

/MICHA
IAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

*P"lyCterfc"

JUSTHEIM ESTATE

PAGE TWO

ORDER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true
of

the

foregoing

Order,

to

the

and

correct

following, this

August, 1989:

Joseph J. Palmer
Attorney for Raymond A. Ebert
15 East 100 South, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
J. Richard Bell
Attorney for Beneficiaries
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

At

j,

copy

day of

TabE

JP>

«h Resources inlernallonaL Inc.

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Walker Buildmo Salt Lake City Utah 64111
phone (801) 363-4391 or 363-6176 or 531-9264

October 10, 1983

Mr. Raymond A. Ebert
Director
Justheim Petroleum Company
2338 East 3740 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

T3[^

Dear Ray:
Following up on our communication regarding Wyoming Petroleum
Corporation, I want merely to state the facts and suggestions
as I see them. If I am incorrect in my facts, please let me
know.
For more than thirty-three years, I have been associated with
C.I. and my father in the oil and gas business in southwestern
Wyoming and in Utah. A good part of this association, of course,
is in the Big Piney and southwestern Wyoming development, as well
as in the Uintah Basin development of eastern Utah.
An important part of the Wyoming development, of course, was the
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. This project was a fifty/fifty
division of interest with my dad and C.I., with each of them
agreeing with each other that they would retain the fifty/fifty
control of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation and in any stock acquired or purchased would be owned 50% by one and 50% by the
other. Again I have enclosed a copy of the Wyoming Petroleum
Corporation agreement entered into September 11, 1953.
We both know the history of this situation. Clarence purchased
additional stock after dad's death, contrary to the spirit, as
well as the letter of the agreement.
I have suggested from the beginning that you and I work together
on Wyoming Petroleum Corporation on a 50/50 basis according to
the way that Dad and C.I. had it worked out from the beginning,
and I still think this is a good approach and continue to suggest that this is the best way to work together and to build
the company.
In my recent discussions with you, you have indicated to me that
Clarence, by his Will, had given you all of his stock of Wyoming
Petroleum Corporation. You mentioned that this was contained in
one of the Amendments or Codicil to Clarence's Will. I have not

EXHIBIT

-/6

, ,l€
V .

Mr. Raymond A. Ebert - 2
read itf but I assume what you say is the case.
Under all of the circumstances, you are obviously in control of
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. This, of course, is not the way
that Clarence or my father envisioned that it would take place
when they wexe working together to put Wyoming Petroleum Corporation together.
If you want to work on a fifty/fifty basis, I believe we can
build the company and make it a great success. This would be
my choice, but this is up to you.
I would suggest that you and I and perhaps Mike Bennion, if Mike
is willing to do so, serve as Directors of the company. You can
be the President, if you want, and I will be the Vice President
and perhaps Mike will be the Secretary and Treasurer. But it is
pretty much up to you as to what you want to do.
Let me know of your decision.
Thank you, and with all best wishes.
Sincerely,

/John H. Morgan, Jr.
Coresident
JHM/lsb
cc: Mr. Frank J. Allen
Mr. J. Michael Bennion
P.S. As to regard the signing of the checks, it is my suggestion
that both your and my signatures should be required.

TabF

November 21, 1983

Mr. Raymond A. Ebert
President
Justheim Petroleum Company
2339 East 3740 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

3 1 PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT V

3.

/?*T3.£5!S

Dear Ray:
Once again I have enclosed a copy of the Agreement which C I. and
Dad entered into on September 11, 1953 regarding Wyoming
Petroleum Corporation and their promise to each other that if one
of them acquired any stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, that
the other one would own it on a fifty-fifty basis.
Including the preceding fourteen years which they had made this a
practice, as recited in the Agreement itself, it was a total of
almost forty-four years that they continued to keep this promise
to each other, because of their mutual appreciation and respect
for each other.
Following Dad's death in February, 1982, I suggested to Clarence
and even urged him to continue to work along on that same basis that any stock purchased or acquired by the other would be owned
one-half by the other partner. In other words, that it would
continue to be a fifty-fifty deal on Wyoming Petroleum
Corporation.
But for some reason Clarence purchased a block of stock
sufficient to give him control of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation.
Keep in mind that Dad and C I. had worked together for some
forty-four years in trying to build that company, in which I
helped them for thirty-three of those years. I just can't
believe that C.I., after forty-four years of working together,
would suddenly turn on his old partner who never one time broke a
promise to him in all those years and deprive him and his family
of what they are entitled to under the Agreement.
Somebody must have talked C.I. into violating that Agreement.
understand you actually went up to Evanston, Wyoming and paid
for the Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock which gave C.I.
control of the company.

I

I have a copy of Clarence's Will which Frank Allen gave to me.
It doesn't mention Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock. In this
case, it would be treated like any other personal property. It
would go to Margaret (Chickie), and after Chickie's death, it
would go to C-I.'s heirs, as well as to Kathryn Bradford and
others named in Clarence's Will. There was never any mention
t

Mr. Raymond A.

Ebert

11/71/83
Page 2
that he was giving all of that stock to you. Yet you tell mp
that you have an Amendment to the Will which gives you all of the
stock. On this basis you have gone in as head and President of
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation and in full char"** *nr* r-rmt-r-rh r^
Wyoming Petroleum Corporation.
I just can't believe that Clarence intended to deprive Chickie
anH Kay and all his heirs of that stock and give it to you.
Ray, you never lifted your finger in helping to build Wyoming
Petroleum Corporation. It seems incredible to me that Clarence
would change his mind and give all of that stock to you.
On the Drilling Proposition, Ray, once again your credibility
would be greatly enhanced if you would produce a copy of your
canceled check (both sides) for the S5,000 which you said you put
up on October 26, proving your 2% investment in the Drilling
Deal. You have everything to gain and nothing to loose by
sending copies of your canceled check to the Directors of
Justheim Petroleum Company.
You claim that there is now a new oil well, better than the
others, but, Ray, even according to Frank's figures, you never
raised anywhere near enough money to drill one well. No one has
still heard about Dominium Oil Company who was supposed to invest
a total of §93,750 for a 15.625% interest in the total drilling
project. Long Petroleum Company, so far as I know, never has put
up their $40,000 for their 25% interest in the first well
compared to Justheim Petroleum Company's 20% for a $60,000
investment.
There is one other matter which I would like to bring to you
attention. According to the copy of the Will which I have,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology was actually given the 1.5
million shares of stock of Justheim Petroleum Company. Of
course, there were certain conditions attached, etc. But the
stock was actually given to them. Yet you tell me now that
according to an Amendment to Justheim*s Will, M.I.T. doesn't get
the stock until Chickie1s death.
The M.I.T. representative, Mr. D. Hugh Darden, has written
several times asking that the Personal Representative and Trustee
furnish additional information regarding the Estate, and I have
enclosed a copy of his latest letter.
Ray, I would like to ask you a question: Can you see any way
that % fairness and equity and justice can be done to Justheim
Petroleum Company, to Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, to the

Mr. Raymond A
11/21/83
Page 3

Ebert

Massachusetts Institute of Technology* to me and my family, to
Chickie, to Kay and to Clarence's heirs? If you do, I would sure
like to hear from you.
Thanks very much.
Sincerely.

John H. Morgan, Jr.
President
JHM/mb
Enclosures

TabG

WHker BuildmQ Sail Lake City Utah 54111
none (MM 363-4391 or 363-6176 or 531-9264

Decercber 4, 1983

Mr. Raymond A. Ebert
President
Justheim Petroleim Ootpany
2338 East 3740 South
Salt lake City, Utah 84109

13

Dear Ray:
You continue to suggest ttot I resign as a member of the Board of Justheim
Petroleum Ccnpany, and you tell me that I will surely be removed frcm the
Board at the next Annual Meeting of the Stockholders. You also continue to
mention that I have completely destroyed the harmony and unity of the Board*
tey, let me tell you how you can achieve perfect harmony and unity with the
Board of Directors. And you can also have my resignation inmediately.
You can furnish us evidence that you and the oonpanies listed in Frank's
letter to the Board of Directors of October 18, a copy enclosed, invested
their money right along with Justheim Petroleum Ccnpany, and on the same
terms, as porposed in I*ank's letter of the 18th.
Now, it iray be a little difficult to get copies of the cancelled checks from
these oarpanies* But you certainly have your cancelled checks, and this
would be a good faith beginning.

Then, surely there was a bank account established for the drilling fund. (The
agreement requires this.) It would be most helpful, and it would not be difficult at all, to send a copy of the bank statement, showing the deposits,
not only of Justheim Petroleum Ccnpany; but also your deposits and the deposits
of the ccnpanies listed in Frank's letter of October 18.
Hcwever, even if you got all the money listed in Rcank*s letter, and your xnoney
as veil, it only amounts to $141,000, according to the information these companies gave me concerning their investment. This isn't enough to drill a well,
Ray. Frank tells us and CKM tells us it takes $300,000 to drill and complete
a well to the Codell formation.
Now, it wouldn't really be that bad if Frank and CKM got other people and
oonpanies than those listed in Rrank's letter, to make the investment along
with Justheim Petroleum Company, although it uould not be as represented.

£g££T
EXHIBIT

Mr. Raymond A. flbert
Page 2, Cent.
But as Directors and Officers in Justheim Petroleum Carpany, we are entitled
to know that other companies and individuals are investing right along with
Justheim Petroleum, and en the same terms; because this is the way it was
represented to us; and this vas the basis on which the money was invested by
Justheim Petroleum Carpany.
So, Ray, you have my resignation; and you can assure harmony and unity with the
Board. All you have to do is furnish us sane iirportant information, which
shouldn't be hard to get at all.
Ray, in your letter to me of November 21, a copy of which went to all the Directors, you mention that iry personal animosty to you can be explained by the
fact that I was not appointed as Co-Personal Representative in Clarence's Will.
No, Fay, that doesn't bother me at all. But there are things about Clarence's
Will which bother me very much. In my letter to you of Nosraaber 21f I explained
how I felt, and enclose a copy of my letter of November 21.
The other Directors of Justheim Petroleum Carpany know very little about Wyoming
Petroleum Corporation. But I think they should teve the background. It is a
company which my Dad and Clarence put together more than 44 years ago, and it
is growing in value every day. Dad and Clarence agreed to a 50-50 control of
Wyoning Petroleum Corporation, pursuant to their Agreement of September 11, 1953,
a copy of which is enclosed.
By Agreement of September 11, 1953, they "re-affirmed their under standing and
agreement of the previous fourteen years,- that they should control Wyoming
Petroleum Corporation on a 50-50 basis, and that any stock purchased or aogtt&ad
by one of them, would be owned 50% by the other one.
I am sending a copy of this Agreement to all the Directors, together with a
copy of my letter of November 21 to all the Directors, so that they can understand
a little of the background, and perhaps why I am concerned about certain aspects
of Clarence's Will; and why it really does bother me.
You
his
was
was
she

see, if there was one thing that Clarence Justheim was certain about in
life, it was that he was going to take care of Margaret (Chickie). Nothing
as important to Clarence as this—not even Justheim Petroleum Ctonpany. C.I,
going to nake oertain that Chickie would never go to a rest home. And that
would get all the attention and care that she needed for the rest of her life.

As I explained in my No^ranhpr ?1 latter tn ynn n m p y rvf *ho Will tJwf 1B>n8PJc *
Ti^ltc^np rimer o r ™ ^ ^ ' ^ T^T-I-WI p r ^ r ^ ^ prig-y^Hr^
Ilrrier ***** cirr
cumstances, all the stock of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation owned by Clarence **
would normally and naturally go to Chickie. This is important, because Wyoming
Petroleum Corporation was and is becalming a very valuable Carpany, with its oil
and gas royalties frcm the Big Piney Field.

{bee <- t?&)
Mr. Raymond A Hbej
Page 3, Oant.
Yet, you have told me many times that Clarence gave all of that Wyoming Petroleum
Corporation stock to you by an Anen&nent to the Will; and that FtankJw4,1^
ftnenctaent.
It just seems incredible to me that Clarence would change his Will, and deprive
Chickie of this valuable stock; and also deprive his other heirs of their porticn
of the Stock, after Chickie passes away. One of Clarence's heirs, I understand,
is a parapalegic who will never live a normal life, and who needs all the help
he can get. But we would have to believe that Clarence changed his xoindr and
wanted you to have all the stock, and his parapalegic relative. *pi4d get none.
We would also have to believe that Clarence changed his mind, and decided to
deprive Kathryn Bradford of her share of the stock, because Kathryn is listed
in the Will to receive a portion of Clarence's assets. Kathryn has been Clarence'<
devoted secretary for more than 35 years.
We would have to believe that he changed his mind, and gave it all to you, Ray.
Somehow, it doesn't all add up. And yet, you have gone in as President of
Vtycming Petroleum Corporation, in full control of the Catpany. I am a Director
and Vice President. But you oould kick me out any time you wanted to do so,
because you have absolute control of the Ccnpany. Yet, I spent 33 years in
trying to help Clarence and ny Dad build that Ccnpany. You didn't lift your
little finger to build Wyoming Petroleum Corporation. Can you understand why
I am bothered?
Also, the copy of the Will which I have actually gives the 1.5 million stares
of Justheim Petroleum Company to the Massachusetts Instutute of Technology, with
you as Trustee. Yet, you tell me that according to the Amendnent to Clarence1 s
Will, that MIT doesn't get that stock until after Chickie passes away.
Why should Clarence want to change the Will to prevent MTT from getting that
stock until after Chickie dies. It doesn't nake sense to me. The MIT people
have been waiting for a long time to get the information on the Estate. You
are the Trustee and the Personal Representative, Ray. You have the responsibility
of sending the information to the MTT.
Finally, Ray, in my letter to you of November 21, I ask you if you can see any
way that fairness and justice and equity can be done to Chickie, to Justheijn
Petroleum, to Wyoming Petroleum, to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
to Kay Bradford, to Clarence's heirs and to me and try family? The one I really
should have included above anyone el9e is Clarence Justheim himself.
I haven't heard anything from you, Ray. And I continue to ask you the same
question. Can you see how fairness and justice and equity can be done iivthis
case?

Mr. Raymond A. flbert
Page 4, Cent.
I recently wrote you a letter concerning the Scdt Lake Area Chamber of Ccnmeroe,
because I really believe that Clarence was 100% behind the QHmber of Commerce
and its objectives, in his desire to help build the Cannunity and nake it a
better place to live and to work. You mentioned that Justheim Petroleum
had already made its contribution to the Chamber. I don't know what it was.
teybe it was $100. But I think Clarence would want more than just a token
contribution to the Chamber. Clarence loved this Community, and wanted to
be an inportant part of its success and growth. Besides, it is an investment—
not a contribution to a Charity.
One of the things I would ask you to do is to consider a real investment in
the Chamber of Canrerce—to really be a part of the growth and development
and success of Salt lake City, and the State of Utah.
ttiere are other ways, Ray, that you can bring fairness and justice and equity
to those people and companies mentioned above. But that is pretty much \^p to
you to decide.

Enclosures: Wyoming Petroleum Corporation Agreement (Copy)
Copy of Letter of November 21
Copy of letter of October 18
Copy of Letter of November 22.
Copy of MTT Letter
cc: Mr. Frank J. Allen
Mr. Kenneth E. Sfriith
Mr. Calvin P. Gaddis
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604 Walker Building. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
elephone (801) 363-4391 or 363-6176 or 531-9264

January 21, 1983

Mr* Ray Ebert
President
Justheim Petroleum Company
2338 East 3740 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Ray:

Efl

I have an apology to make to you.
In my letter of January 12, in which I sent copies to the other
Directors, I referred to the two checks for $20,000 each which
were written to you from Justheim Petroleum Company. Now, you
may have the impression I was trying to connect you with some illegal activity. This is not the case. I don't want to leave that
impression. At the Directors' meeting, as I recall, you said you
did it that way in order to bait me. If this is the case, it is
not a very mature way to conduct corporate business. I thought
there might be some other explanation for this. If I left the
wrong impression, I apology for this.
Also, I want to clarify, if possible, the Will situation. I don't
want to leave the wrong impression with you or the other Directors.
I don't want to leave the impression that you were engaged in illegal activities. But we have found that the Will, or the Codicil
to the Will, has some major defects, including the fact that it
was not witnessed. Frank Allen has one of the best legal minds
that I know; and no one knows better than Frank that it requires
two witnesses for the Will to be legal. Therefore, I am certain
that Frank did not prepare the Will, even though Frank was Clarence's
lawyer. But I have to ask the question: Who did prepare the Will,
or the Codicil to the Will? Clarence didn't know how to type. Ray,
I don't know who put the Codicil to the Will together. Perhaps you
know. Once again, I don't think there is any illegal activity,
and I don't want to leave the impression with the other Directors
that there is illegal activity. No doubt there is an explanation
for this. If so, and if you feel you would like to explain it,
I would appreciate hearing the explanation.
Would you please consider my situation for a minute, Ray? I worked
with'C.I. and Dad for 33 years in trying to build something worthwhile in the oil and gas business. Justheim Petroleum Co., Wyoming

Mr. Ray Ebert
Page 2, Cont.
Petroleum Corporation and the other Companies are the results of
this effort, in my judgment. Therefore, when I see you come in
with really no background in trying to help build these Companiei
and gain absolute control of Wyoming Petroleum Corporation, contrary to an agreement of 44 years which C.I. and Dad had honored
all this time; and insisting that you own all of that Wyoming Petroleum Corporation stock, it really gets to me. Also, I am really
upset with the possibilities that neither Chickie nor Jack Bradford nor any of Chickie's heirs or C.Ifs heirs would get any of
that stock. It isn't fair.
But these are the facts, Ray, as I see them. I don't want to
leave a wrong impression with anyone, and I make more mistakes
than most people, and no doubt I have given the wrong impression
to you and the other Board Members. I want to leave the right
impression, and give the facts, as I see them. Therefore, if I
have given the wrong impression, I apologize. But I invite you,
if you so desire, to give the facts, as you see them.
But let me tell you something, Rays Clarence and I had some fantastic battles. We really did a lot of fighting. But we always
came up friends. We always shook hands at the end of the day.
This was the only basis on which we could, and did, stay together.
And of course, this was the basis on which Dad and C.I. stayed
together for 44 years.
I have made a lot of mistakes, Ray, much more than my share. I
apologize for them, and hope I can do a lot better. And I hope
you and the other Directors accept my apology. But you know,
every day we can start out with a clean slate. I hope we can do
it. As far as I am concerned, I would like to try.
But whether I resign, or whether you kick me out as a Director,
I still want to be your friend. Why don't you give me a chance?
With best wishes,

Tab I

I, Clarence I. Jus the in, being of sound and tEsntfsing mixta

ana

memory end free frcr.; all nenece, fraud, duress, undue influence
or restraint vhctsoever, do hereby no*.:e this codicil to my Last
V7ill and Testament Milch ics signed by r.e, June 22, 1972 •
Prior rVln-cno1: on

I hereby revoke ell prior bequests and.

testamentary dispositions node by ne concerning my interest and
stock holdings in the Wyoning Petroleum Corp., of i/hich I ov/n
rpprcxinatoly Fifty percent (JO;*)*
I hereby jive, bequeath, and devise to

Raynond A. IZhcrt,

to be

his absolutely, -.rithcut accountability in the distribution
provided for ir. the residunry of r.y CP:O vrill, nil of ny
interert and stcc:: holdings in the Vyor.ir.- Petroleum Corp«, if he
is living, otherwise to his children, if any are living, children
c-'T deecass-d children to ta!:c ay right of representation^
I.h-ve hereunto set ny hand, this 2?th d?,y of i^y, 19ol*

Grentor

Clarence I. Jui^iibcin
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